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RECONCILING THE CONFLICTING RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND 
DEFENDANTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
MUGAMBI JOUET* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into 
force on July 1, 2002, heralding a new era in international justice for the 
prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.1  Whenever 
gross human rights violators are apprehended and tried at the ICC, their alleged 
victims literally may have their day in court.  The ICC reached new grounds in 
international criminal law by providing victims with legal standing to be 
represented by counsel and formally participate throughout trial and other 
court proceedings.  This article will explore whether victim participation will 
unduly conflict with defendants’ rights and undermine the ICC’s ability to 
justly adjudicate atrocity crimes. 
The analysis of this article will revolve around three key premises.  First, it 
is a fundamental principle of international law that every defendant, no matter 
how wicked or unpopular, has the right to an utterly just trial.  The United 
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
recognizes “the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family” and posits that all criminal defendants have the 
right to a “fair” and “impartial” trial where they are “presumed innocent until 
proven guilty.”2  The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) espouses the same moral and legal principles.3 
 
* Staff Attorney, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York City.  B.A., Rice University, 2001; 
M.P.A., Public Policy, New York University, 2003; J.D., Cum Laude, Northwestern University, 
2006.  I am grateful to Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Professor and Director of the Center for 
International Human Rights at the Northwestern University School of Law, for guiding my 
writing during a seminar. I also thank Professor Stephen Sawyer for his editorial suggestions. 
 1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
183/9 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52-53, 54, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 72, 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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Second, victims should participate in criminal proceedings in some 
capacity.  Victims of crime—in particular victims of atrocities like genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes—have several important needs, 
including: 1) receiving financial compensation for their harms; 2) seeing that 
culprits get retribution so long as the punishment is reasonable; 3) having a 
forum to speak and be heard; and 4) obtaining closure and truth about the 
political affairs behind their harms.  Participation in ICC proceedings could 
help satisfy these needs and alleviate the suffering of victims of atrocities in 
post-conflict societies seeking a peaceful transition towards democracy. 
Third, during a criminal proceeding, defendants’ due process rights must 
trump alleged victims’ participatory rights.  The rights of alleged victims (the 
accusers) and defendants (the accused) will sometimes conflict since they are 
inherently adverse parties.  Unlike the longstanding right of defendants to a 
just trial with due process, the right of alleged victims to participate in 
proceedings is a new concept in international criminal law.  Victims had no 
such rights in prior international criminal courts created by the global 
community, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),4 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),5 and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone that was created by agreement between the 
United Nations and the Sierra Leone government.6  Likewise, the ICCPR and 
UDHR do not grant victims this right.  Defendants’ rights must therefore trump 
alleged victims’ rights.  As will be shown, the ICC’s Statute and Rules actually 
adopt this principle.7  In light of these three premises, the challenge lies in 
reconciling the conflicting rights of defendants and victims by granting victims 
the most participation possible without violating defendants’ rights. 
The structure of this essay will proceed as follows.  After briefly surveying 
the ICC’s victim standing rule and its origins in continental European law, I 
outline the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s first decisions on victim participation in 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,8 which will be the first case tried by the 
Court.  I subsequently posit that, due to deficiencies in the Court’s Statute and 
Rules, there is a risk that victim participation could violate defendants’ due 
process rights, such as by lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof, shifting 
this burden to the defense, and undermining the presumption of innocence.  I 
 
 4. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 5. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 19, 2003). 
 6. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2004). 
 7. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3. 
 8. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Applications for 
Participation in Proceedings a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06, a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to 
a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Oct. 20, 2006). 
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then add that victim participation may also interfere with prosecutors’ strategic 
decisions and judges’ ability to manage proceedings effectively.  I thereafter 
suggest that the rule be amended or interpreted narrowly so that victim 
participation does not conflict with defendants’ rights.  Given that the ICC has 
not yet completed any case, attention is paid to the experience of the ICTY to 
illustrate challenges that the ICC may encounter.  Next, I examine three 
predictable counter-arguments to my proposed reforms to the victim standing 
rule—namely that 1) granting defendants “excessive” rights will unnecessarily 
frustrate efforts to convict persons who are obviously guilty; 2) the suggested 
problems with victim participation are unlikely to occur because it is 
unfathomable that any defendant at the ICC will be deprived of a fair trial; and 
3) victims are entitled to full participation in ICC proceedings.  Following 
rebuttal of these positions, this article concludes by arguing that the interests of 
victims are often better served by truth and reconciliation commissions than by 
criminal prosecutions, although prosecuting defendants remains necessary and 
must consequently be conducted according to international norms and 
standards on defendants’ rights, which justifies considering the proposed 
approach to victim participation. 
II.  ICC VICTIM STANDING RULE’S ROOTS IN EUROPEAN LAW 
The ICC grants important rights to both defendants and victims.  Its Statute 
and Rules provide numerous due process guarantees to ensure that every 
defendant has a fair trial devoid of unfair prejudice.9  The rights afforded to the 
accused include public hearings conducted fairly and impartially, equal justice, 
prompt notification of all charges, discretion to choose one’s counsel or have 
one appointed by the court if unable to pay, confidential communications with 
counsel, adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, trial without undue 
delay, the right not to be compelled to testify without silence being considered 
as proof of guilt or innocence, the right to be free from coercion, the right to be 
free from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the right to be 
presumed innocent until the prosecution has proven guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt.10  The rights of defendants at the ICC therefore generally conform with 
 
 9. It is important to stress the difference between mere prejudice and unfair prejudice.  All 
relevant incriminating evidence introduced against a defendant is necessarily prejudicial to his 
interests.  That does not make this evidence unfair.  Likewise, a prosecutor’s prerogative to argue 
that a defendant is guilty is necessarily prejudicial to the defendant’s interests, although there is 
nothing unfair about such arguments in and of themselves.  Conversely, it is unfairly prejudicial 
to violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial marked by due process of law. 
 10. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 55, 66, 67; International Criminal Court, 
Regulations of the Court, May 26, 2004, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04, at 83-86 [hereinafter ICC 
Regulations]. 
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international laws and standards on the administration of justice, as provided 
by the ICCPR, UDHR, and norms of practice. 
Moreover, the ICC recognizes that victims have important rights and 
needs.  The substance of crimes under the ICC Statute heeds the forms of 
victimization that have been prevalent in recent and ongoing conflicts.  For 
instance, attention has been paid to the conscription of children as soldiers,11 
which is a particularly grave problem in Africa.12  The Statute also “marks [an] 
advance in the gender sensitiveness of international law[, as] it includes a 
comprehensive definition of gender-based war crimes and crimes against 
humanity” that encompass rape and other sexual abuses.13  Besides the 
substantive crimes that the Court seeks to punish and deter, a special support 
unit is responsible for obtaining legal advice for victims, notifying them of 
their rights, informing them of the Court’s decisions, ensuring their security, 
and providing them with medical and post-traumatic psychological assistance, 
including specialized services for victims of sexual violence.14  Whenever the 
Prosecutor opens an investigation, purported victims “may make 
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber” about crimes to be investigated.15  
Further, the Court is empowered to “establish principles relating to reparations 
to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation.”16  The Court “may make an order directly against a convicted 
person specifying appropriate reparations” for victims and their families.17  
Alternatively, reparations can be paid through a special Trust Fund subsidized 
by ICC member states.18 
 
 11. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8 § 2(b)(xxvi). 
 12. Amnesty International, Report: Human Rights Owes the Child ‘The Best it Has to Give,’ 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=B0275B42F3B4C25380256900006933EF 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2007). 
 13. MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
ACHIEVEMENT 112 (2006); ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 7 § 1(g), 8 § 2(b)(xxii), 8 § 2(e)(vi). 
 14. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Sept. 10, 2002, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, at 16-19, 86-
91 [hereinafter ICC Rules]; ICC Regulations, supra note 10, at 79-82. 
 15. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15 § 3. 
 16. Id. at art. 75 § 1. 
 17. Id. at art. 75 § 2. 
 18. Id. at arts. 75, 79; see also ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 173-175; ICC Regulations, supra 
note 10, at 88, 117.  During negotiations to establish the Rome Treaty, a significant number of 
delegations opposed a proposal that would have allowed the ICC to force a state to pay 
reparations to victims if the state bore some degree of responsibility for the crimes.  Opposition to 
this proposal was partly rooted in the understanding that the ICC was intended to deal solely with 
individual criminal responsibility. Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparations to Victims, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, 
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 262, 267-68 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
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Most importantly, the ICC Statute gives victims standing to participate in a 
trial and other court proceedings.  The rule is codified in Article 68 § 3 of the 
Statute: 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which 
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal 
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.19 
Article 68 § 3 was created after intense discussions between treaty 
negotiators, as countries essentially split into two camps respectively, 
representing civil and common law traditions.20  Delegations from civil law 
countries were particularly supportive of victim standing,21 which is 
commonplace in their legal systems, unlike in common law jurisdictions.22  
The French government and certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
were especially insistent about granting victims broad standing rights.23  The 
ensuing compromise partly consisted of making victim participation 
discretionary, as partisans of incorporating the term “may” in the Statute’s 
language prevailed over those preferring “shall.”24 
 Article 68 § 3 consequently became the principal basis for the ICC’s 
victim standing rule, which draws its roots from continental European 
systems.25  Even though continental systems are not uniform and vary 
according to whether they are civil Germanic (Austria, Germany, Turkey, etc.), 
Nordic (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, etc.), civil Romanic (France, Italy, Spain, 
etc.), or mixed (Greece),26 they all give victims standing to participate in 
 
 19. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3 (emphasis added); see also ICC Regulations, 
supra note 10, at 86-87. 
 20. WILLIAM BOURDON & EMMANUELLE DUVERGER, LA COUR PENALE INTERNATIONALE: 
LE STATUT DE ROME (COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE) 203 (Olivier Duhamel ed., 2000). 
 21. Claude Jorda & Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1399 (Antonio 
Cassese et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002). 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1400.  Notably, in April 1999, the French 
government hosted an international seminar on victims’ rights in international criminal law. Id. at 
1399, n.43 (citing C. Trean, Organiser les Droits des Victimes Devant la Justice Internationale, 
LE MONDE, Apr. 30, 1999).  NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also 
advocated for victim participation. See id. at 1400, n.46. 
 24. BOURDON & DUVERGER, supra note 20, at 203. 
 25. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3; Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1399. 
 26. MARION E. BRIENEN & ERNESTINE H. HOEGEN, VICTIMS OF CRIME IN 22 EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 49 (2000). 
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criminal proceedings under the concept of partie civile.27  Conversely, victims 
have virtually no such standing in common law jurisdictions like England, 
Ireland, and the United States.28  This article will therefore examine the 
different role victims play in these systems as a background consideration to its 
analysis of the ICC’s victim standing rule. 
A. Continental European Systems 
Continental European systems use inquisitorial criminal procedures under 
which victims have standing to participate in court and certain judges have 
investigative responsibilities.29  The primary systemic role for a crime victim is 
as a civil claimant, which enables the integration of his civil claim for 
compensation directly into criminal proceedings.30  Insofar as a civil 
claimant’s interventions are related to his claim for damages, he is generally 
permitted to participate in all court proceedings by arguing his views and 
concerns, questioning witnesses, appealing a defendant’s acquittal insofar as it 
bars compensation, etc.31  The procedure is advantageous for victims because 
if the prosecution is successful, the victims will not have to prove the 
defendant’s liability for damages in a separate civil suit.32  When a defendant 
is acquitted, jurisdictions vary on whether they allow victims to initiate a 
separate civil suit for compensation.  For instance, French law forbids civil 
court judges from reaching decisions contrary to those of criminal court 
judges,33 but Norwegian law permits liability in civil court even if a defendant 
was acquitted in criminal court.34 
In misdemeanor cases and, to a lesser extent, in felony cases, continental 
systems generally allow victims to act as private prosecutors, which enables 
them to directly summon the accused to court and seek to prove his guilt 
without the involvement of government prosecutors.35  Unlike a civil 
claimant’s participation, a private prosecutor’s participation is not restricted to 
the reach of his civil claim for compensation, thereby enabling the private 
prosecutor to expressly seek the defendant’s conviction in addition to 
damages.36  Nevertheless, government prosecutors can usually intervene and 
dismiss the case if they deem that prosecution is not justified.37  Countries 
 
 27. BOURDON & DUVERGER, supra note 20, at 203. 
 28. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 39. 
 29. Id. at 39. 
 30. Id. at 27. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 319. 
 34. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 736. 
 35. Id. at 28. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 28-29. 
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have instituted different checks on the private prosecutor procedure, such as 
France’s provision that the private prosecutor must pay for court costs and the 
accused’s legal fees if the accused is found not guilty.38  Certain countries go 
even further, such as Spain, which allows felonies to be privately prosecuted 
by virtually any person, even if he is neither a victim nor a citizen, so long as 
the government has declined to prosecute the case.39 
Accordingly, continental systems grant victims extensive rights to 
participate in court proceedings, thereby effectively limiting the government 
prosecutors’ discretion to control criminal cases.40  In fact, if a government 
prosecutor declines to investigate or prosecute a case, alleged victims typically 
have a formal right to appeal this decision to a higher public authority who 
may then order the prosecutor to proceed with the case.41 
B. Common Law Systems 
Common law systems typically do not give victims standing to participate 
in criminal proceedings.42  Their criminal justice procedures revolve around an 
adversarial system pitting the state against one or more defendants.43  Victims 
are not formal parties to the process, and judges do not have investigative 
responsibilities.44  If a prosecutor declines to investigate or prosecute a case, 
victims typically lack a formal procedural right to ask another official to 
review the decision.45  Certainly, victims can use the political process to 
pressure a prosecutor to indict someone.  Prosecutors who routinely fail to 
investigate or prosecute cases are unlikely to either be reelected or keep their 
appointed positions.  Nevertheless, when prosecutors indict a defendant, 
victims have no right to participate in proceedings until the sentencing hearing, 
if the defendant is convicted.46  Victims may nonetheless appear as witnesses if 
requested by the state or the defense.  But the common law systems’ reliance 
 
 38. Id. at 322; see generally Valérie Devrieux, The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 218 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., Cambridge University Press 
2002). 
 39. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 28, 857-58. 
 40. Id. at 26. 
 41. See id. at 333-34 (discussing French system). 
 42. Observations on the American criminal justice system are based on the author’s 
professional experience.  Observations on European common law systems are based on BRIENEN 
& HOEGEN, supra note 26, and EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (Mireille Delmas-Marty & 
J.R. Spencer eds., Cambridge University Press 2002). 
 43. BRIENEN AND HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 245. 
 44. Id. at 244, 248. 
 45. Id. at 270, 490.  In America, the principle of prosecutorial discretion means that the 
government essentially has unfettered discretion whether to prosecute cases.  See, e.g., Reno v. 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (stressing that 
“prosecutorial discretion” is a “special province of the Executive”). 
 46. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 39. 
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on plea bargaining results in trial avoidance, which means that authorities tend 
to dissociate themselves from victims when they have no need for them to 
serve as witnesses.47  As part of the adversarial system, victims who are called 
to testify are subjected to cross-examination by the defense.48  Conversely, the 
inquisitorial system used in continental jurisdictions does not necessarily 
authorize defendants to confront and cross-examine victims, which is 
perceived as harsh treatment.49 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that criminal procedures vary across 
common law countries.  For example, victims in America have fewer standing 
rights than in England.  Neither the federal government nor any state in the 
American system permits private prosecutions.  While private persons can seek 
punitive damages in civil court and recover substantial financial compensation, 
only public officials can prosecute cases.  However, in England, any citizen is 
permitted to privately prosecute a case, even if he is not an alleged victim.50  
No special status is actually provided to victims.  During a public prosecution, 
victims have no standing right to join the case, unlike in continental European 
systems.51 
Common law systems have counter-balanced the victims’ limited role in 
criminal court by defending their interests in other ways.  England has the 
strongest state compensation scheme and victim support service of all 
Europe.52  Unlike judges in most continental systems, English judges also have 
the authority to order defendants to pay compensation to the victims even if the 
victims have not formally requested damages.53  Further, common law systems 
allow victims to assume a rather significant role at sentencing.54  In recent 
years, legal reforms have allowed the use of “victim impact statements” 
explaining the harm that victims have suffered due to the defendants’ actions 
and demanding punishment, financial damages, or other forms of 
compensation.55 
 
 47. Id. at 247. 
 48. Id. at 39. 
 49. Id. at 39. 
 50. J.R. Spencer, The English System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 142, 152-53 
(Mireielle Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., Cambridge University Press 2002). 
 51. Id. at 156.  It must also be noted that acting as a private prosecutor is a difficult endeavor 
in England, as indigent citizens or victims must find their own counsel, and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions can dismiss the case altogether at any time.  BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 
259, 270.  Ireland also grants victims a limited capacity to act as private prosecutors.  Id. at 479-
80. 
 52. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 285. 
 53. Id. at 244, 285. 
 54. Id. at 481. 
 55. Id. at 481, 267-68. 
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Aside from compensation through criminal proceedings, common law 
countries enable victims to seek compensation in civil courts as well.  In 
America, for example, victims can prevail in civil court even if the defendant 
has been acquitted in criminal court, as civil liability requires a lower burden 
of proof than criminal guilt. 
A thorough comparative analysis of criminal procedures in civil and 
common law systems is beyond the scope of this article.  The foregoing 
commentary merely demonstrates that the ICC victim standing rule is rather 
similar to victim standing rules in continental European systems, somewhat 
analogous to the right to private prosecution in England and Ireland, and 
markedly different from American criminal procedures. 
The ICTY’s and ICTR’s procedures are essentially patterned after the 
Anglo-American common law adversarial system,56 as the victims’ only role is 
to serve as witnesses called by the prosecution, defense, or the court.  Those 
called to testify face possible contempt charges for failing to appear or to state 
the truth,57 although one can certainly imagine why certain traumatized victims 
would prefer not to serve as witnesses, especially if they fear reprisals from the 
accused.  In sum, while ICTY and ICTR proceedings have little use for non-
testifying victims, those victims serving as witnesses have virtually no choice 
but to abide by the awesome power of the courts’ authority. 
Victim participation in judicial proceedings may be a progressive 
procedure because it recognizes that proceedings can benefit from the direct 
contribution of individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the commission 
of the charged crimes.58  Permitting victim participation also suggests a 
pragmatic acknowledgment that victims and prosecutors do not necessarily 
have the same interests, as argued in Part V below.  Victims can therefore 
serve as a check on prosecutorial discretion, which is often unbridled in 
common law countries.  Besides, victim participation can contribute to putting 
a human face on proceedings,59 especially if the latter are conducted in The 
Hague, a remote location from crime scenes often situated in war-torn 
developing countries.  In addition, the ICC may be able to administer 
restorative justice by directly awarding reparations for victims,60 which is 
 
 56. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1391. 
 57. Id. at 1390; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Feb. 11, 1994, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39, at 77; International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, June 29, 1995, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1, 
at 77. 
 58. Carsten Stahn et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings of the ICC, 4 J. 
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 219, 221 (2006). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Gerard J. Mekjian & Mathew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim’s Voice: Analysis of 
Victims’ Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International Criminal Court, 17 
PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 17 (2005). 
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permitted at neither the ICTR nor the ICTY,61 although reparations are 
increasingly required by international law.62  Victim standing at the ICC might 
therefore be a sign of progress, although adequate procedures will be necessary 
to apply the rule without violating defendants’ rights. 
III.  THE ICC REACHES ITS FIRST DECISIONS ON VICTIM PARTICIPATION 
In October 2005, the ICC issued its first arrest warrants, seeking the 
apprehension of five leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan militia 
allegedly responsible for killing tens of thousands of victims, as well as other 
atrocities.63  The five wanted men are accused of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.64  But the case has stalled partly because of an ongoing 
controversy over whether the Ugandan government should grant them amnesty 
in exchange for a peace deal, and whether Uganda even has the power to refuse 
to comply with an arrest warrant after referring the case to the ICC.65  
Meanwhile, another case will be the first to proceed to trial.66  In March 2004, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) referred a situation to the ICC 
Prosecutor, which led to the opening of an investigation.67  This eventually led 
to the arraignment of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo at the ICC on March 20, 2006.68  
Lubanga Dyilo, known as a Congolese warlord and militia leader, is accused of 
war crimes in enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and 
using them to participate actively in hostilities, in violation of Article 8 § 2 of 
the Rome Statute.69  The allegations include kidnapping children as young as 
seven and turning them into soldiers, sex slaves, and servants in the conflict-
 
 61. Id. at 11-15. 
 62. Peter G. Fischer, Comment, The Victims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal 
Court—Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 187, 197-201 
(2003). 
 63. Emily Wax, Net Tightens Around Northern Uganda’s Brutal Rebel Militia: Lord’s 
Resistance Army Unchecked for 20 Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2005, at A12. 
 64. Id.; Press Release, International Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against 
Five LRA Commanders, U.N. Doc. ICC-20051014-110 (Oct. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=114&l=en.html (last visited April 11, 2007). 
 65. See generally Will Kony Come Out of the Bush?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2006, at 56, 
57; Heeding Truce, Rebel Leader From Uganda Waits in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at 
A18. 
 66. Marlise Simons, Criminal Court Hears Its First Case; Congolese Warlord is Accused of 
Abuses, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, March 21, 2006, at 3. 
 67. Jérôme de Hemptinne & Francesco Rindi, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Allows Victims to 
Participate in the Investigation Phase of Proceedings, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 342, 342 (2006). 
 68. Simons, supra note 66. 
 69. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, U.N. Doc. ICC-OTP-20060302-126 (Mar. 17, 2006), available at 
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prone Ituri region of the DRC.70  The Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately confirmed 
the charges against Lubanga Dyilo and allowed the case to proceed to the Trial 
Chamber.71 
Lubanga Dyilo challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction to try him.72  Several 
victims were empowered by the Chamber to submit their observations on this 
matter.73  The victims argued that the ICC has jurisdiction and that Lubanga 
Dyilo’s motion must be denied.74  Victim participants likewise argued against 
Lubanga Dyilo’s motion seeking provisional release from ICC detention.75  
Predictably, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied Lubanga Dyilo’s jurisdictional 
challenge and release.76  Even though these outcomes would probably still 
have been the same if victims had not presented their views, their participation 
as litigants on these important issues was nonetheless a clear victory for the 
victims’ rights movement.  Yet, the admission of victims into proceedings has 
proved to be a tortuous path marred by controversial due process issues.77 
Thus far, the Court’s decisions have been more or less amenable to 
victims’ applications for participation.  In May 2005, well before Lubanga 
Dyilo was charged with any crimes by the ICC, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
received applications to participate in proceedings from alleged “victims of the 
situation” in the DRC.78  The Chamber subsequently appointed an attorney to 
represent their interests.79  In a noteworthy decision issued on January 17, 
2006, the Chamber broadly interpreted victims’ participatory rights.80  After 
considering the submissions of the parties and the ICC’s Victims and 
Witnesses Unit, the Chamber granted to six alleged victims the right to 
 
 70. Id.; Simons, supra note 66; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, 
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 71. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the 
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2006). 
 73. Id. at 4. 
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Defence (Oct. 9, 2006). 
 76. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-512, Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute (Oct. 3, 
2006) at 11. 
 77. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 347-48. 
 78. Id. at 343. 
 79. Id. at 343. 
 80. Id.; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006). 
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participate in court proceedings at a relatively early stage of the investigation 
of the DRC situation,81 which preceded the issuance of an arrest warrant 
against Lubanga Dyilo on March 17, 2006.82 
Since Article 68 § 3 contemplates victim participation “at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court,” the Chamber reasoned 
that the term “proceedings” encompasses the investigation phase.83  It 
elaborated four requirements for determining whether alleged victims should 
be allowed to participate in investigation proceedings.  Relying on Rule 85 (a), 
it concluded that applicants must: i) be natural persons; ii) have suffered harm; 
iii) allege crimes covered by the ICC’s jurisdiction; and iv) show a causal link 
between the alleged crimes and the harm.84  The Chamber held that victims’ 
applications to partake in investigation proceedings would be granted when 
there are “grounds to believe” that these four requirements are satisfied.85 
The Prosecutor strongly opposed the alleged victims’ applications, arguing 
that victim participation “in the investigation phase was not envisaged” by the 
Rome Statute, and that the purported victims’ influence “could jeopardize the 
objectivity and integrity” of the Prosecutor’s investigation.86  The Chamber 
rejected these arguments and granted the six alleged victims’ applications to 
participate in judicial proceedings related to the investigation.87  The Chamber 
also denied the Prosecutor’s request to file an interlocutory appeal of this 
decision.88  Notably, it held that: i) the Prosecutor failed to adduce “concrete 
evidence” that victim participation in the investigation phase would impede the 
fairness of the proceedings;89 ii) the Chamber’s decision merely created a 
“very limited” system of victim participation that essentially relies on a “case-
by-case” evaluation;90 and iii) “the Chamber will ensure the impartiality and 
integrity of the investigation at all stages of future proceedings.”91  The 
Prosecutor then unavailingly sought extraordinary review from the Appeals 
 
 81. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 343. 
 82. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 69. 
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Chamber, which unanimously dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds 
since no interlocutory appeal was permitted by the Rome Statute under these 
circumstances,92 thereby leaving the appeal’s substance “non-justiciable” at 
this stage.93 
In spite of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s relatively broad interpretation of 
victims’ participatory rights, it has not hesitated to limit victim involvement in 
other respects.  First, the Chamber placed restrictions on the scope of 
participation of the aforementioned six alleged victims.94  For example, the 
Chamber twice rejected victims’ applications to participate in status 
conferences, thereby depriving them of equal participatory rights to the 
prosecution and defense.95  Second, the Chamber clarified that admitting 
victims into investigation proceedings for a situation did not grant them a 
license to participate in a concrete case against any individual that may stem 
from the investigation of the situation.96  Hence, the six victims of the 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were constrained to reapply 
for participation in the case of Lubanga Dyilo after charges were entered 
against him.97  The Chamber remarkably rejected their applications.98  Three 
of the alleged victims did not demonstrate “any causal link between the harm 
they suffered and the crimes contained in the arrest warrant against Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo.”99  The three other alleged victims did not provide sufficient 
evidence to give reasonable grounds to believe that their harm was directly 
linked to the crimes charged against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo or that they 
suffered harm by intervening to help direct victims or to prevent them from 
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(Sept. 4, 2006). 
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and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006) at 17-18. 
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becoming victims.100  Both the prosecution and defense had argued that the 
alleged victims’ applications should be denied.101 
But this decision did not dissuade other potential victims from applying, as 
the Chamber subsequently invited the prosecution and defense to submit their 
observations on a whopping sixty-five new applications.102  The Chamber 
eventually concluded that fifty-eight of these applicants would be barred from 
participating in the proceedings, mostly because they failed to substantiate a 
causal link between their alleged harm and the crimes charged against Lubanga 
Dyilo.103 
Further, as noted above, the Chamber invited potential victims to submit 
their observations on Lubanga Dyilo’s challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction to try 
him.104  The Chamber then granted three victims’ applications to participate in 
proceedings.105  All three victims were parents acting in a representative 
capacity for their children, who allegedly endured harm and were killed as a 
result of their conscription into armed forces led by Lubanga Dyilo.106  The 
parents also acted as victims on their own behalf because they allegedly 
suffered as a result of the killing and harm wrought on their children and other 
relatives.107  The Prosecutor reasserted his prior position that victims’ 
allegations should be denied when they did not directly relate to Lubanga 
Dyilo’s case.108  Nonetheless, he supported victims’ applications insofar as 
they concerned crimes sufficiently linked to the charges in the case.109 
The ICC’s decisions thus far may be perceived as a victory for victims’ 
rights.  Yet, they concurrently raise problematic issues for defendants’ due 
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process rights.  The decision authorizing alleged victims to participate during 
the investigation phase might result in violations of defendants’ rights by 
prejudicing the impartiality and independence of the Prosecutor.  While any 
investigation must devote equal attention to incriminating and exonerating 
factors, alleged victims could unduly influence the Prosecutor to press 
unwarranted charges.  The Prosecutor could also be pressured to disregard 
other factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to press 
charges, such as the crimes’ gravity, the burden on the Court’s caseload, and 
whether prosecution will impede societal reconciliation.110 
The most controversial due process issue thus far may have been the 
Chamber’s decision to allow certain victims to participate in the proceedings in 
an anonymous capacity.111  The Chamber faced a dilemma in deciding how to 
balance defendants’ due process rights against the need to protect victims from 
intimidation, threat, or harm.112  It tackled this problem by barring the defense 
from knowing the alleged victims’ identities, as provided by Rule 87.113  
Consequently, any information that could lead to victims’ identifications was 
expurgated from documents and victims’ applications provided to the defense 
for Lubanga Dyilo.114 
The defense vehemently protested that it must know who is bringing legal 
proceedings and seeking compensation against the accused115 by raising 
several points: i) protective measures are extraordinary and were unjustified by 
Rule 87 under these circumstances; ii) the victims’ applications amounted to 
improper anonymous accusations; iii) the redacted victim allegations that were 
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provided to the defense were too vague, such as by omitting or expurgating the 
age of the children concerned at the time of the alleged incident, even though 
Lubanga Dyilo is charged with using children as soldiers;116 iv) a complete 
defense cannot be organized without verifying a purported victim’s identity, 
age, residence, and place of origin, as well as the location, place, and dates of 
the alleged crimes;117 v) expurgated information may be exculpatory or 
otherwise useful to the defense,118 such as by indicating the absence of a causal 
link to the charged crimes;119 vii) the accused’s right to be tried without undue 
delay is compromised by constraining the defense to spend much more time 
analyzing partially expurgated applications’ contents;120 viii) providing 
information about victims and their allegations to the prosecution but not the 
defense violates “the right to equality of arms and to a fair trial;” and ix) Rule 
87 § 3 does not prevent a victim’s identity from being revealed to the defense 
but only to the “public,” “press,” and “information agencies,” as the rationale 
behind the rule is that security measures must always be subordinate to a 
defendant’s rights.121 
The Pre-Trial Chamber struck a middle ground in ruling on some of these 
issues when the defense filed a motion opposing victims’ participation in the 
hearing addressing whether the charges against Lubanga Dyilo should be 
confirmed.122  The Chamber found that the deterioration of the safety situation 
in certain areas of the DRC had diminished the effectiveness of security 
measures that could otherwise protect victims and witnesses living in these 
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areas.123  The Chamber therefore granted several victims’ requests to remain 
anonymous in order to shield their identities from the defense during the 
confirmation hearing.124  However, the Chamber also held that the privilege of 
anonymity comes with the cost of limiting the extent of victims’ participation 
because “the fundamental principle prohibiting anonymous accusations would 
be violated [if victims] were permitted to add any point of fact or any evidence 
at all to the Prosecution’s case file against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in the 
notification of charges document and the list of evidence.”125  Accordingly, the 
Chamber held that victims would only receive notification of the public 
documents in the case’s record and would only be permitted to attend hearings 
open to the public.126  Further, the Chamber exercised its discretion to 
determine the extent of victim participation under Rule 97 (3) by allowing 
victims’ representatives to make opening and closing statements but not 
question witnesses.127  The Chamber noted that it might authorize victims to 
participate to a greater extent if they consented to the disclosure of their 
identities to the defense.128  Thus, the Chamber rejected part of the defense’s 
arguments against witness anonymity and expurgation, although it reminded 
the Prosecutor of his duty to disclose exculpatory or otherwise helpful 
evidence to the defense.129 
The Chamber likewise denied the defense’s claim that victim participation 
violates the presumption of innocence.130  Notably, the defense had argued that 
allowing purported victims to participate in the confirmation hearing assessing 
the charges against Lubanga Dyilo would be premature since recognizing an 
applicant as a victim entails recognizing the defendant’s guilt, thereby 
violating the presumption of innocence.131  The defense added that, by creating 
a “grounds to believe” standard for recognizing someone as a purported victim, 
the Chamber’s admission of victim applicants invited “an appearance of 
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prejudgment, if not actual prejudgment.”132  The Chamber found that this 
argument could not prevail “unless the procedural framework provided in the 
Statute and the Rules is considered an infringement per se of the presumption 
of innocence.”133  But the Chamber concluded that victim participation posed 
no such problem.134  The Pre-Trial Chamber twice denied defense motions for 
leave to appeal on this issue, holding that the defense did not demonstrate how 
an interlocutory appellate resolution was required to ensure the fairness and 
expeditiousness of the proceedings.135 
In sum, the ICC’s first decisions on victim participation have raised 
concerns about defendants’ rights.  Yet, this should not overshadow the fact 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber has taken commendable steps to protect defendants.  
It has encouraged the defense (and prosecution) to submit their observations or 
objections on victims’ applications for participation.136  Further, it appointed 
an ad hoc counsel to represent the interests of any potential suspect during the 
investigation phase of the situation in the DRC.137  It likewise appointed an ad 
hoc counsel to defend the rights of potential suspects during the investigation 
of the Darfur situation.138  It also reprimanded the Prosecutor for improperly 
making ex parte filings aiming to prevent the defense not only from responding 
to the filings’ content but also from becoming aware of the filings’ actual 
existence.139  In addition, it granted the defense’s motion to prevent the 
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Prosecutor from coaching, rehearsing, or otherwise preparing the testimony of 
its witnesses, which is generally considered unlawful and unethical in most 
countries, with the notable exception of the United States.140  The Pre-Trial 
Chamber also granted the defense’s request to have the prosecution disclose 
any criminal record of its witnesses as relevant to assessing the witnesses’ 
credibility.141 
Overall, the ICC has thus far taken measures that have been either 
favorable or unfavorable to victims and defendants’ respective interests.  
Having reviewed the Court’s first decisions on victim participation at the pre-
trial stage, this article subsequently analyzes due process problems that might 
occur at the trial phase. 
IV.  ANALYZING POTENTIAL DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS WITH THE VICTIM 
STANDING RULE 
Whereas the ICC’s victim standing rule has evident roots in continental 
European law, it fails to specify whether victims will act as civil claimants or 
private prosecutors or as a combination of these roles.  In fact, the Court’s 
Statute and Rules are rather vague and ambiguous on the issue of victim 
participation, which could lead to differing interpretations of their language. 
The means and substance of victim participation are often unspecified.  
Under the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, one may infer from 
omissions in the Statute and Rules that victims were deliberately precluded 
from employing certain means for asserting their claims.  After all, the Statute 
and Rules do not formally empower victims with the right to participate in the 
Prosecutor’s investigation, access evidence gathered by the parties, call 
witnesses to testify, or file an appeal.142  Victim participation in pre-trial 
investigation proceedings may also have been intended to be restricted to 
representations in writing.143  On the other hand, one may posit that these 
specific rights must logically be extrapolated from general statutory provisions 
because the Statute and Rules should be interpreted broadly in order to give 
victims concrete powers.144  Indeed, without these rights, victims may lack the 
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ability to meaningfully participate.  Their interventions could have little 
weight, credibility, and persuasiveness against those of the prosecution and 
defense.145  Comparably, the Statute and Rules do not concretely specify 
whether victim participation should be permitted in proceedings during the 
investigation phase.  The Prosecutor argued that participation in this phase 
should not be permitted because victims were not specifically granted this right 
under the Rome Statute, thereby effectively invoking the expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius paradigm.146  The Pre-Trial Chamber disagreed and held that 
this right can be extrapolated from Article 68 § 1, which generally obliges the 
Court to “take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical well-being, 
dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.”147  The Court’s judges and 
Prosecutor have therefore already strongly differed in their interpretation of the 
Statute and Rules. 
Most importantly, the Statute and Rules do not concretely specify the 
purpose of victim participation.  This article previously identified four different 
types of victim needs.148  The drafters of the Statute and Rules may have 
intended for victim participation in judicial proceedings to help alleviate these 
needs, although the Statute and Rules themselves nowhere define either the 
needs of victims or the specific purpose of participation.  Article 68 solely 
refers to the “personal interests” and the “views and concerns” of victims.149  
The Statute and Rules do not specify whether participation is restricted to the 
reach of victims’ claims for financial compensation as civil claimants or 
whether their role will be akin to that of private prosecutors who can expressly 
seek the defendant’s conviction in addition to damages.  Without knowing why 
victims have standing, it becomes equally uncertain what victims will do in 
court and when they will do so.  If victims are to act as civil claimants, their 
participation will be relatively narrow and consist only of introducing 
evidence, questioning witnesses, or making arguments related to reparations.  
Moreover, since reparations cannot be paid unless a defendant has been found 
guilty,150 victim participation could technically be delayed until sentencing 
hearings at the end of trials.  Conversely, if victims are to act as private 
prosecutors, they will assume broad participatory rights and have the same 
powers as ICC Prosecutors to seek conviction and retributive punishment for 
the accused.  They could then enter proceedings from the outset.  This seemed 
 
 145. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1412-13. 
 146. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-84, Prosecution’s Reply on 
the Applications for Participation 01/04-1/dp to 01/04-6/dp (Aug. 15, 2005) at 3. 
 147. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006) at 12. 
 148. See supra Part I. 
 149. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3. 
 150. Id. at art. 75 § 2. 
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to be the Pre-Trial Chamber’s interpretation when it allowed victim 
participation early in the investigation stage.151 
Notwithstanding the Statute and Rules’ vagueness, we can infer from 
Article 68’s language that victims should have broad participatory rights.  It is 
logical to assume that the “personal interests” and the “views and concerns” of 
victims will relate not only to their need for financial compensation but also to 
their need to see that culprits get reasonable retribution for their crimes.  
Victims may therefore act as private prosecutors and be allowed to argue a 
defendant’s guilt in and of itself, especially since obtaining damages is 
contingent on a defendant being proved guilty.  In addition to granting victims 
expansive powers to argue, broad participation would also be consistent with 
victims’ need for a forum to speak and be heard, as the victims’ lawyer could 
then generally attest to their suffering and the defendant’s responsibility.152  
Broad participation would also help satisfy victims’ need for closure and truth 
by exposing the state of affairs behind their victimization, an issue that will be 
addressed in the latter part of this article.  This author’s analysis of the victim 
standing rule will therefore be colored by these assumptions and inferences 
about why the rule exists, what actions it entails, and when victims will get 
involved.153  Naturally, these assumptions would not be necessary if the victim 
standing rule was not so vague. 
The only statutory provision impeding broad participation provides that 
victims have the right to appear “at stages of the proceedings” that are “not 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.”154  In other words, defendants’ rights will trump victims’ rights 
whenever they conflict, and victim participation must be deferred so long as it 
conflicts with defendants’ rights.  The main problem is that defendants’ rights 
 
 151. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision 
on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in 
the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the investigation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006). 
 152. Even though a lawyer could speak on their behalf, many victims may wish to testify 
personally.  But the Statute and Rules do not specify whether victims have the right to appear as 
witnesses themselves on their own motion, even if they are not called to testify by the Court, 
prosecution, or defense.  Besides, due process may require that victim litigants cannot serve as 
witnesses because this would pose a conflict of interest.  Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner 
of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 22 (citing Jorda & 
Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1409). 
 153. As in continental European systems, victims at the ICC can appeal a prosecutor’s 
decision not to investigate or prosecute a case.  ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 107.  A pre-trial 
chamber can also review such decisions sua sponte and request victims’ views on the matter.  Id. 
at 93, 109. 
 154. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3. 
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almost inherently conflict with victims’ rights due to the ICC’s definition of 
who is a victim. 
The Rules define victims as “natural persons who have suffered harm as a 
result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”155  
It is fair to conclude that this definition encompasses victims’ family members 
and close friends, who suffer indirect harm due to the commission of a crime 
against their loved ones, especially if those loved ones were killed.  Serious 
injury or death to a provider can also affect the well-being of his 
dependents.156 
When an alleged victim applies to participate in the proceedings, judges 
are responsible for determining whether he is really a victim.157  The Court 
Rules merely state that a chamber “may reject the application if it considers 
that the person is not a victim.”158  Nowhere do the Court’s Statute and Rules 
specify the standards for making this decision.  The Statute and Rules do not 
define what types of facts indicate that someone is a victim, although these 
criteria can technically be determined by examining the statutory elements of a 
crime.  While the prosecution or defense can move to support or reject a 
victim’s application, judges apparently have ample discretion to decide the 
matter.159  As noted above, in Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber exercised 
this discretion to elaborate four requirements for determining whether alleged 
victims should participate in investigation proceedings.160 
Discretion will also be required to remedy the Statute and Rules’ failure to 
state the level of proof required to make these findings.  How much evidence is 
necessary to establish that a person is a victim?  Is it the equivalent of evidence 
sufficient to support a finding (a significant level), a preponderance of the 
evidence (over 50% probability), clear and convincing evidence (circa 75%), 
or evidence beyond reasonable doubt (near absolute certainty)?  The Statute 
and Rules do not answer these questions. 
Certainly, Article 66 requires the prosecutor to prove the accused’s guilt 
“beyond reasonable doubt.”161  This could be a befitting standard for proving 
that someone is a victim.  Yet, because it is a high burden to make a 
determination beyond reasonable doubt, it is unlikely that such a determination 
could be made before the prosecution and defense have introduced all the 
 
 155. ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 85(a).  The Rules also recognize that “[v]ictims may 
include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which 
is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic 
monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.” Id. at 85(b) 
 156. Stahn et al., supra note 58, at 232. 
 157. ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 89(2). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85; Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 345. 
 161. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 66 § 3. 
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evidence, made all their arguments, and rested their cases.  Applying this high 
standard of proof would therefore defeat the purpose of the victim standing 
rule, which seeks to have victims participate in the guilt phase of a trial and 
perhaps even in pre-trial and investigation proceedings.162  Judges will 
consequently require a lower level of proof to establish that someone is a 
victim.  Predictably, in Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber set a relatively 
low standard in allowing victim participation in investigation proceedings 
when there are “grounds to believe” that the four aforementioned criteria are 
satisfied.163 
However, allowing victim participation under such a low evidentiary 
threshold could lead to violations of defendants’ rights.  By finding that certain 
individuals are victims, a judge effectively decides two key elements that the 
Prosecutor normally would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt: 1) a crime 
happened and 2) there are victims.164  Indeed, the Statute and Rules do not 
specify the procedural and substantive implications of allowing alleged victims 
to enter the proceedings.  One is thus left to conclude that by finding that 
applicants are victims of the alleged crime for which the defendant is 
prosecuted, judges also necessarily find that the alleged crime has occurred. 
Judges will make these findings of fact on an incomplete evidentiary 
record because they will rule on the alleged victims’ applications before the 
prosecution and the defense have completed their cases.165  This problem could 
be technically resolved by having judges wait to rule on the applications until 
both the prosecution and defense have rested.  After all, alleged victims have 
the right to appear in court “at stages of the proceedings” that are “not 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.”166  But this would again reduce participation to post-trial 
sentencing hearings.  Accordingly, the victim standing rule effectively entices 
judges to rule on applications well before both the prosecution and defense rest 
their cases, which may take months or even years.167  The victim standing rule 
might therefore lead to due process violations by encouraging findings on key 
elements based on an incomplete evidentiary record and before the prosecution 
and defense have made closing arguments analyzing the evidence. 
 
 162. Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 343-44. 
 163. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006); Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 345. 
 164. The ICC does not address so-called “victim-less crimes” like drug-dealing, which is 
often described as a crime against society.  For every ICC crime, there is necessarily a victim.  So 
finding that someone is a victim entails concluding that a crime occurred. 
 165. ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 89. 
 166. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3 (emphasis added). 
 167. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1412. 
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The victim standing rule might also violate other ICC provisions.  Article 
66 states that every defendant “shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty” 
and that “[t]he onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused . . . 
beyond reasonable doubt.”168  A high burden of proof therefore rests squarely 
with the prosecution.  But by enticing judges to find before a trial’s end—or 
even its start, in Lubanga Dyilo—that there are victims and that, by extension, 
the prosecuted crime occurred, the victim standing rule makes the Prosecutor’s 
job easier.  Indeed, the judge’s findings lower the Prosecutor’s burden of proof 
on the aforesaid two key elements, thereby allowing the Prosecutor to 
concentrate on his burden of proving whether the defendant is the actual 
culprit.  Naturally, a judge’s grant of an alleged victim’s application is not the 
exact equivalent of a judge’s final verdict.  Even after such a grant, the 
Prosecutor will continue introducing evidence of victimization and of the 
occurrence of a crime.  Nevertheless, a granted application is the functional 
equivalent of a preliminary verdict.  In Lubanga Dyilo, the defense had this in 
mind when it complained of “an appearance of prejudgment, if not actual 
prejudgment.”169  At the very least, it relaxes the Prosecutor’s burden of 
proving that victims exist and that the prosecuted crime happened. 
After the Court has approved an alleged victim’s application, a defendant 
is still free to challenge this approval by introducing additional evidence and 
presenting contrary arguments.170  But this places the burden of proof on the 
defense to rebut the aforementioned two key elements, although Article 66 
stresses that the entire burden of proof rests squarely with the prosecution.171  
Article 67 § 1(i) underlines that the prosecution’s burden of proof should never 
shift to the defense since every defendant has the right “[n]ot to have imposed 
on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.”172  
The presumption of innocence is therefore indirectly undermined by forcing a 
defendant to rebut elements of a crime before the Prosecutor has proved them.  
However, the presumption of innocence not only presumes that the defendant 
is not the culprit, it also presumes that elements of a crime are not established 
until they are actually proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
Further, the victim standing rule unfairly prejudices the defense by 
significantly limiting the range of defense theories available to an accused 
person.  First, the rule undermines the so-called “reasonable doubt defense,” 
where the defendant argues that the prosecution is simply unable to prove all 
the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the rule entices 
 
 168. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 66. 
 169. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-338, Decision on 
Defence Motion for Leave to Appeal (Aug. 18, 2006) at 4. 
 170. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67. 
 171. See id. at art. 66 § 2. 
 172. Id. at art. 67 § 1(i). 
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judges to find that there are victims and that, by extension, the prosecuted 
crime occurred—all of this on less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Second, subsequent to the court’s acceptance that victims exist, the rule 
makes it much harder for the defendant to adopt the standard defense theory 
that “no crime occurred at all.”  The rule effectively entices or relegates 
defendants into adopting the separate defense theory that “there was a crime, 
but I didn’t do it.”  Arguing that no crime occurred at all is tantamount to 
arguing that the law was never broken.  The accusation could be a lie, or it 
could be an innocent mistake, such as a misidentification.  Comparably, the 
defendant can argue that his actions were not illegal under the circumstances, 
such as due to self-defense.  Hence, “[n]o crime occurred at all” is a defense 
theory that can be construed in various ways by advancing justifications and 
excuses that are recognized as defenses under international law173 and by the 
ICC.174 
Admittedly, this theory is likely to appear completely far-fetched and 
unreasonable in the overwhelming majority of ICC cases because the Court 
only addresses offenses such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.175  The magnitude of such crimes frequently results in the 
accumulation of such damning evidence (mass graves, slews of video-recorded 
footage, hundreds of eyewitnesses, etc.) that it is often impossible to 
reasonably argue that no crime at all occurred.176  Further, there is no question 
that the alleged conduct was illegal, as one cannot reasonably argue that 
committing massacres and other atrocities is permitted. 
Consequently, one could argue that the victim standing rule is not 
problematic because the “[n]o crime occurred at all” defense is wholly 
inapplicable to the type of crimes tackled by the ICC.  But this argument would 
go too far, as certain ICC crimes are amenable to a reasonable use of this 
defense theory.  For example, consider the war crime of attacking civilians.  
Among other elements, guilt requires the prosecution to prove that the 
perpetrator directed an attack at a civilian population not taking part in 
 
 173. Antonio Cassese, Justifications and Excuses in International Criminal Law, in THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 951, 951-54 
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2002). 
 174. The ICC recognizes several justifications and excuses, including mental disease, 
intoxication, self-defense, duress, mistake of fact, mistake of law, and superior orders. Id. at 954 
(citing ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 31-33).  These are not absolute defenses that will 
necessarily always result in an acquittal and absolve all criminal responsibility. 
 175. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5. 
 176. I write “reasonably argue,” as it is always possible to argue anything without being 
reasonable.  To this day, there are unreasonable individuals denying that Nazi Germany 
committed genocide against the Jewish people during World War II despite massive evidence to 
the contrary. 
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hostilities.177  A defendant may therefore contend that he is not guilty because 
he was acting in self-defense since the civilians were actually involved in the 
hostilities, such as by serving as rooftop snipers.  Under such a theory, the 
civilians would not be victims.  But the victim standing rule would permit the 
civilians to enter the proceedings, not even as alleged victims, but as actual 
victims pursuant to a finding made on less than proof beyond reasonable 
doubt.178  The defendant would therefore be disadvantaged in trying to argue 
that no crime ever happened because he first would have the burden of 
rebutting the Court’s conclusion that these particular civilians were victims. 
The sniper example described an incident involving the defendant and the 
alleged victims, although no crime occurred because the alleged victims were 
not victims under the circumstances.  But one can go further and conceive of 
other examples where no incident occurred at all and an accusation against the 
defendant is entirely false.  One need only look at the intensity of the hatred in 
recent conflicts between, for instance, Serbs and Kosovars or Hutus and Tutsis 
to imagine that elements of these populations would be willing to make a false 
complaint in order to frame persons whom they view as brutal enemies.  To 
state a few examples, war crimes like unlawful confinement,179 taking 
hostages,180 improperly using a truce flag,181 or even running medical or 
scientific experiments182 are amenable to false complaints by purported victims 
lying about what happened to them.  “No crime occurred at all” would 
obviously be an appropriate defense in such situations. 
Hence, the victim standing rule could violate the ICC’s own guarantee to 
afford each defendant a fair trial insofar as it might: i) infringe on due process 
of law by enticing judges to make findings on key elements favorable to the 
prosecution’s case based on insufficient evidence and arguments; ii) lower the 
prosecution’s burden of proving each element of a crime beyond reasonable 
doubt; iii) shift the burden of proof to the defense by effectively relegating it to 
rebut elements before the prosecution has proved them beyond reasonable 
doubt; iv) undermine the presumption of innocence by forcing the defendant to 
disprove elements before the prosecution has proved them beyond reasonable 
doubt; and v) curtail the ability of an accused to defend himself by making 
reasonable use of the “reasonable doubt” and the “no crime occurred at all” 
defense theories. 
 
 177. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8 § 2(b)(i). 
 178. For further discussion on alleged victims and the presumption of innocence, see John R. 
W. D. Jones, Protection of Victims and Witnesses, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1355, 1357 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 
Oxford University Press 2002). 
 179. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8 § 2(a)(vii). 
 180. Id. at art. 8 § 2(a)(viii), (c)(iii). 
 181. Id. at art. 8 § 2(b)(vii). 
 182. Id. at art. 8 § 2(b)(x). 
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V.  PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES MAY OPPOSE VICTIM PARTICIPATION 
In addition to defendants, prosecutors and judges at the ICC may be tepid 
about the prospect of victim participation.  At the outset, it is important to 
dispel any notion that the Prosecutor is necessarily the ally of victim litigants.  
In both the DRC situation and the Lubanga Dyilo case, the Prosecutor has 
vehemently opposed victim participation on several occasions.183  While the 
Prosecutor has supported certain victims’ applications,184 it is now clear that a 
peculiar de facto alliance between the prosecution and defense can materialize 
against victim litigants. 
There are numerous reasons why a prosecutor may be lukewarm about 
sharing his duties with victims’ attorneys.  While this would be especially true 
of prosecutors from common law countries that do not permit victim standing, 
it may be true of all ICC prosecutors in general.185  First, a prosecutor and a 
victims’ counsel may not have the same theory of the case, which would lead 
them to make inconsistent arguments and undermine the prosecutor’s ability to 
secure a conviction.  Second, even if they have the same theory, they may 
disagree over the proper trial strategy, including the wisdom of introducing 
evidence of debatable probative value, the respective strengths and weaknesses 
of a particular line of witness questioning, whether it is necessary to call a 
potentially tricky witness altogether, etc.  More specifically, consider the 
example of a defendant who chooses to testify and is subject to cross 
 
 183. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 
and VPRS 6 (Jan. 17, 2006); Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-135, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 17 
January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 
3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 (Mar. 31, 2006); Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-172, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings 
Submitted by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the Case the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (June 29, 
2006) at 3-4; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision 
on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in 
the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the investigation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006) at 3-5; see also Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-589, Formatted and Redacted Version of Prosecution's Observations 
on the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 (Oct. 
19, 2006) at 12. 
 184. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-228, Decision on 
the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the 
case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the investigation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (July 28, 2006) at 3-5. 
 185. For additional arguments regarding the Prosecutor and victims’ diverging interests, see 
Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1394-1397. 
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examination by the prosecutor and the victims’ lawyer.186  The most dramatic 
moment in a criminal trial often occurs when a prosecutor gets this unique 
opportunity to directly question the defendant.  While witnesses can typically 
explain themselves in a re-direct examination by the opposing counsel, there is 
great value to the sound cross-examination of a defendant who makes a series 
of incriminating admissions pursuant to a prosecutor’s leading questions.  
Since what the defendant says can sometimes literally make or break the 
prosecutor’s case, the challenge of conducting a solid cross-examination is 
particularly high in this circumstance.  Naturally, the pressure on the 
prosecutor will be vastly greater in an ICC case given the monumental stakes 
of a high-profile prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war 
crimes.  Accordingly, one can easily imagine an ICC prosecutor sighing in 
relief upon concluding the successful cross-examination of a defendant, only to 
be disconcerted a few moments later by the fact that the victims’ counsel may 
recklessly conduct another cross-examination that could allow the defendant to 
redeem himself.  In sum, since prosecutors may feel concerned that victim 
participation will jeopardize their ability to convict defendants, it is 
conceivable that they will object to victims questioning witnesses, introducing 
evidence, or even participating in a trial altogether before sentencing. 
The risk that victims and the prosecution will follow diverging strategies is 
accentuated by victims’ apparent lack of a formal right to access evidence 
gathered by the prosecution and defense.187  Victims may consequently lack 
the information necessary to fully understand the theories and strategies of the 
other parties.188  Accordingly, even when victims are determined not to hamper 
the prosecution’s strategy, they may inadvertently do so insofar as they will be 
constrained to operate under this procedural blindfold.189  Moreover, this could 
unduly prolong proceedings since victims may ask witnesses for information 
that would otherwise be readily accessible from the prosecution’s files.190  
Wild goose chases could occur if victims pursue lines of questioning that they 
 
 186. We must generally note that cross-examinations are by nature delicate endeavors 
because a lawyer is trying to extract probative information from a witness who has been called by 
the adverse party, and is therefore frequently hostile to the cross-examiner.  To many attorneys, 
the motto for cross-examination is to “get in and get out” and avoid a “fishing expedition.”  A 
good cross-examination is often relatively brief and highly focused, as the cross-examiner must 
keep control of the witness and delicately obtain the information from him without opening the 
door for the witness to explain away his statements.  A sloppy cross-examination will be 
unfocused and allow the witness to justify himself or wander in his testimony by introducing new 
information that was not elicited on direct examination and that may prove harmful to the cross-
examiner’s case. 
 187. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1412. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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would know are futile if they had access to the prosecution’s evidence.  Of 
course, these problems may be the lesser of two evils, as forcing the 
prosecution to share all its evidence with victims may not be advisable, 
especially insofar as it concerns sensitive political or diplomatic questions.  
Regardless, even if the prosecution were to share access to its evidence with 
victims, voluntarily or by court order, fairness might require that it share this 
evidence with the defense as well.191 
Judges may also have reservations about victim participation.  Judges are 
responsible for ensuring that proceedings run smoothly and according to 
schedule.192  Their responsibility is especially difficult in high-profile 
international prosecutions involving complex legal and factual issues, 
numerous witnesses, loads of evidence, and a palpable sense of emotion and 
tension due to the gravity of the accusations, high political stakes, and intense 
public scrutiny afforded by incessant media coverage.  The introduction of 
victims as represented parties into ICC proceedings will further complicate 
these matters and render international criminal trials even harder to manage, 
especially if separate lawyers represent different groups of victims.  Thus, 
judges may try to limit the extent of victim participation. 
Victim participation could make ICC judges’ jobs more difficult than those 
of judges at the ICTY and ICTR, where prosecutors are essentially solely 
responsible for representing and safeguarding victims’ interests.193  
Conversely, ICC judges have a great responsibility to protect victim’s interests 
since they must decide the extent of their participation.194  Moreover, ICC 
judges are exclusively responsible for dealing with all technical matters 
relating to assessing victims’ reparations.195  Judge Claude Jorda, who 
formerly served as Presiding Judge on the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, has 
underlined that, by granting judges what may prove to be an intractable duty 
due to the large scale of ICC crimes and ensuing reparation claims, the 
Statute’s framers took the risk of “complicating the proceedings before the 
Court and of seriously compromising the[ir] expeditious conduct.”196  For 
 
 191. The defense for Lubanga Dyilo has argued that providing information about victims and 
their allegations to the prosecution but not the defense violates “the right to equality of arms and 
to a fair trial.”  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, 
Defence Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims 
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defense.  See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-517, 
Decision Concerning the Prosecution Proposed Summary Evidence (Oct. 4, 2006). 
 192. See Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1413. 
 193. Id. at 1408. 
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instance, in the first six months after Lubanga Dyilo began, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber has already had to examine dozens of victim applications.197  This 
burden will probably grow exponentially as the ICC takes on more and more 
cases. 
Notwithstanding possible opposition from Prosecutors and judges, Article 
68 § 3 only restricts victim participation insofar as it is “prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”198  
Nothing specifically provides for victim participation to be limited when it is 
inconsistent with the objectives or the strategy of a Prosecutor.  Judges may 
therefore be unreceptive to the objections that prosecutors will have to victim 
participation.  Similarly, judges will have little choice but to permit victim 
participation even when it hinders their ability to manage proceedings 
effectively.199 
Despite the protections that Article 68 § 3 affords to the defense, the 
accused likely will have to bear the brunt of the troubles associated with victim 
participation.  In addition to the aforementioned due process problems, victim 
participation will extend proceedings that are already extremely complicated 
and long, which could potentially violate the accused’s right under Article 67 § 
1(c) to a fair trial devoid of undue delay.200  The defense for Lubanga Dyilo 
has already been confronted with the need to respond to forty-three new 
requests for victim participation under a rather short deadline.  The defense 
protested that it lacked the time and resources to examine and investigate 
victims’ applications given its workload in tackling a host of other matters 
pending trial, which purportedly violated Article 67 § 1(b)’s guarantee of 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense.201  The Chamber 
took steps towards addressing these concerns by granting deadline 
extensions202 and providing the defense with an additional legal assistant.203 
 
 197. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-463, 
Decision Authorizing the Filing of Observations on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06 and a/0071/06 (Sept. 22, 2006); 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-494, Decision 
Authorizing the Filing of Observations on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings 
a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 (Sept. 29, 2006). 
 198. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3 (emphasis added). 
 199. Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1411. 
 200. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence 
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 15-16; Stahn et al., supra note 58, at 223. 
 201. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, Defence 
Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06 (Sept. 4, 2006) at 15-16. 
 202. See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-407, 
Decision on the Prosecution Deadline of 12 September 2006 and the Defence Deadline of 12 
September 2006 (Sept. 7, 2006). 
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Slowing down cases and increasing resources for the Court, Prosecutor, 
and defense may be the only way of containing the increased workload 
associated with victim participation.  Of course, slowing cases even further is 
unlikely to satisfy victim litigants, victims at large, and the general public, who 
all generally complain about the slow pace of cases at the ICTR and ICTY.  
But this may be a reasonable price to pay for victim participation.  Most 
importantly, in light of the due process risks associated with participation, the 
victim standing rule may have to be amended or interpreted in a way that does 
not infringe on defendants’ rights. 
VI.  SUGGESTED AMENDMENT OR INTERPRETATION OF THE VICTIM STANDING 
RULE 
The ICC Statute and Rules may have internal contradictions between 
victims’ and defendants’ rights.  The challenge lies in reconciling the 
conflicting rights of defendants and victims by granting victims the most 
participation possible without violating defendants’ rights.  There are two 
possible remedies to this problem: adequately interpreting the victim standing 
rule or amending it. 
An adequate interpretation of the Statute and Rules could focus on Article 
68 § 3, which effectively posits that defendants’ rights trump victims’ rights.204  
Victims do not have absolute participatory rights since they can only get 
involved in “stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the 
Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”205  Thus, the question is not 
whether victims should enter the proceedings.  It is when they should do so. 
The victim standing rule might not violate defendants’ rights if the ICC 
declines alleged victims the right to enter the proceedings until after they have 
been proved to be actual victims beyond reasonable doubt. Bifurcating 
proceedings could be a step towards resolving this problem, as it would 
preclude judges from allowing victims to enter proceedings before the 
prosecution or a victim litigant has established beyond reasonable doubt that: i) 
a crime occurred; and ii) the alleged victims are the actual victims of this 
crime.  After this first step, the case would then move on to address the second 
step of whether the defendant is the actual culprit, as well as any other 
elements.206  Nevertheless, bifurcating trials might not work in practice.  When 
the prosecution would move for a ruling on these two elements, the defense 
 
 203. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-460, Decision on 
Defence Request pursuant to Regulation 83 (4) (Sept. 22, 2006) at 3. 
 204. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Note that Judge Jorda of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has offered an alternative proposal 
for bifurcating proceedings.  Jorda & Hemptinne, supra note 21, at 1414. 
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may object that the ruling must be delayed until the defense has rested its 
entire case and made its closing arguments.  If a judge overruled the objection 
and found that the two elements had been met, this could compel the defense to 
rebut these elements and shift the burden of proof in violation of Article 67 § 1 
(i).  Notwithstanding these eventual complications, bifurcating proceedings has 
the potential to remedy or attenuate the aforesaid due process problems. 
Support for bifurcating proceedings under this interpretation of the Statute 
lies in the fact that the ICC’s Statute and Rules, contrary to what some 
commentators have argued,207 do not provide for a utilitarian balancing test 
measuring the benefits of a victim’s participation against its costs in unfairly 
prejudicing a defendant’s trial.  The Statute and Rules say nothing of balancing 
a victim’s interests against a defendant’s rights.  Instead, Article 68 § 3 states 
that victims are not allowed to participate in legal proceedings if this would be 
“prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.”208  Conversely, a 
utilitarian balancing test would allow victims to participate when their interest 
in doing so is deemed to outweigh prejudice to defendants’ rights.  By 
implication, a balancing test would permit victim participation even if it 
violated defendants’ rights because the emphasis would not be on the 
importance of the violation but on whether victims’ interest in participating 
outweighed the violation.  Yet, Article 68 § 3 emphasizes that victim 
participation is impermissible if it would violate defendants’ rights, regardless 
of whether the violation would be relatively minor in comparison to victims’ 
interests in participating.209 
Certainly, Article 69 § 4 suggests a balancing test by emphasizing that the 
Court may consider “the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that 
such evidence may cause to a fair trial.”210  But this balancing test does not 
apply to victim participation issues since Article 69 (titled “Evidence”) is 
supplanted by the more specific rule provided under Article 68 (titled 
“Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the 
proceedings”).211  Thus, the applicable rule as provided by Article 68 is that 
victim participation is always impermissible if it would result in any unfair 
prejudice, even if the victims’ interests might outweigh the unfair prejudice. 
The ICC member states should consider amending the Statute to codify 
this interpretation.  Nonetheless, limiting victim participation to the second 
phase of the bifurcated procedure may not be politically feasible because this 
could be seen as going too far in retracting victims’ rights.  But the member 
 
 207. Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 60, at 29-34. 
 208. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3; see also ICC Rules, supra note 14, at 91 § 3. 
 209. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68 § 3. 
 210. Id. at art. 69.  This balancing test is akin to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in American 
law.  See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 211. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 68, 69. 
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states should still consider amending the Statute and Rules to ensure that 
defendants’ rights are duly protected if victims are to participate throughout 
investigation, pre-trial, trial, and appellate proceedings.  Adequate procedures 
for victim participation are required because the current standards are far too 
vague, which will give way to extensive judicial discretion.  Of course, judicial 
discretion can certainly be very positive because legislators cannot foresee and 
codify all issues and situations.  In fact, during Rome Statute negotiations, 
many delegations were preoccupied that victim participation might become 
unmanageable due to the large number of victims.212  Instead of developing 
specific procedures on victim standing, the drafters therefore apparently 
proceeded to leave the modalities of victim participation to be resolved by 
judges’ discretion.213  Judges will consequently have the discretion to make 
many important decisions, and the extent of victim participation will 
presumably be resolved by the Court’s jurisprudence as cases are litigated. 
While judicial discretion may prove beneficial in allowing flexible 
decision-making, the Statute’s drafters may have overlooked the risk that the 
victim standing rule could be construed in ways that are unfairly prejudicial to 
defendants’ rights.  Thus, an amendment may be necessary.  An appropriate 
construction of the victim standing rule could be a provision in the vein of: 
A judge must reject the application of an alleged victim if there is not a 
reasonable basis to conclude that this person could be proved to be an actual 
victim at trial.  Allowing an alleged victim to participate in proceedings is not a 
recognition that the prosecuted crime occurred.  The prosecutor or an alleged 
victim has the burden of proving that the prosecuted crime occurred beyond 
reasonable doubt.  The prosecutor or an alleged victim has the burden of 
proving that the alleged victim is an actual victim beyond reasonable doubt.  
An alleged victim will be referred to as a private accuser in all court 
proceedings until proven to be an actual victim beyond reasonable doubt in a 
final judgment of conviction.214 
This proposed rule would draw a strict distinction between an alleged 
victim and an actual victim and create a specific evidentiary standard of 
reasonableness as the degree of proof for allowing someone to be recognized 
as an alleged victim.  Of course, reasonableness can be an imprecise 
evidentiary standard because judges may have different conceptions of what is 
reasonable.  Yet, judges could not realistically make meaningful 
determinations under preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing 
evidence, or beyond reasonable doubt standard until a trial had been concluded 
 
 212. Gilbert Bitti & Håkan Friman, Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE 456, 457 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Emphasis added for demonstrative purposes. 
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and all evidence and arguments are on the record.  This could frustrate the 
rule’s purpose by limiting victim participation until sentencing or reparation 
proceedings.  Reasonableness could be a relatively low level of proof, although 
it is appropriate for a finding that someone is an alleged victim.215  Findings 
made under a higher standard would risk lending credence to a pretense that 
the alleged victim is in reality an actual victim before there is proof beyond 
reasonable doubt at the end of a trial.  This suggestion may comport with the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo, where the Court set a 
relatively low burden of proof to authorize victim participation in investigation 
proceedings with “the grounds to believe” that someone is a victim.216  But the 
Chamber did not define the victim litigants as alleged victims, which could 
lead to the aforesaid due process problems.217 
Further, an alleged victim could be referred to as a “private accuser” in 
court.  The adjective “private” would separate the person’s status from the 
Prosecutor’s public mandate as a civil servant commissioned by the ICC 
member states.  The term “accuser” would reflect the notion that an alleged 
victim is essentially another accuser in addition to the ICC Prosecutor.218  
Additionally, the degree of proof to establish that a crime occurred and that 
someone is an actual victim would be evidence beyond reasonable doubt.  The 
proposed rule would allow the burden of proof on these elements to be 
satisfied by either the Prosecutor or the private accusers. 
While these reforms could technically prevent the burden of proof from 
shifting to the defense, they could also mend problems with the presumption of 
innocence.  The Pre-Trial Chamber was correct in holding that victim 
participation cannot be an outright violation of the presumption of innocence 
because this would signify that the Statute and Rules’ procedural framework is 
“an infringement per se” of the presumption.219  However, even though victim 
 
 215. Several statutory sections already employ a “reasonable basis” standard.  See ICC 
Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 15, 18, 53. 
 216. See Hemptinne & Rindi, supra note 67, at 345. 
 217. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101, Decision on the 
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participation may not inherently violate the presumption of innocence, it could 
severely undermine it insofar as victim litigants are treated as actual victims 
but not as alleged victims. 
Whereas this author’s suggested reforms would redefine the status of 
victims as mere private accusers, they would expand the rights of victims in 
other respects.  As previously noted, in continental Europe, the traditional role 
for victims in criminal proceedings is as civil claimants.220  Participation is 
often restricted to establishing a claim for compensation due to financial or 
emotional harm, as the responsibility to prove criminal guilt lies with the 
public prosecutor.221  However, since reparations are contingent on a 
defendant’s conviction, the ICC should allow private accusers to argue the 
defendant’s guilt in and of itself.  If alleged victims are allowed to participate, 
they should also logically be allowed to try and prove the defendant’s guilt.  
The victim’s role would be analogous to that of a private prosecutor, who may 
operate alongside a public prosecutor at trial in many European countries. 
The ICC could benefit from allowing victims to play such a role.  
European inquisitorial criminal justice systems have taken commendable steps 
to limit prosecutorial discretion.222  Allowing alleged victims to prosecute 
cases may reflect a progressive notion that crime should no longer be 
perceived as a mere intrusion on public order, nor should the state be solely 
responsible for seeking redress.223  Because crimes are hostile acts by 
individuals against each other, victims should also play an active role in 
obtaining justice.224  However, the private prosecutor’s role should be adapted 
to ICC proceedings.  While many European countries allow alleged victims to 
privately prosecute defendants without the involvement of any public 
prosecutor (although the latter can intervene to dismiss the case), this 
procedure would not be suitable for the ICC, at least because it would 
presumably lead a host of alleged victims to bring private prosecutions.  The 
ICC is a relatively small court with a limited number of judges, and it could 
not endure such a high caseload.  So an alleged victim should only be allowed 
to privately prosecute an individual if the ICC Prosecutor is already handling 
the case.225  In any case, granting victims such a right would not be a material 
difference from the status quo, which already tends to allow victims to 
 
 220. BRIENEN & HOEGEN, supra note 26, at 27. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 15-16. 
 223. Id. at 30-31. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Even when the ICC prosecutor decides to bring the case, a risk would remain that an 
unmanageable number of alleged victims would try to enter the proceedings.  The risk could be 
overcome by ensuring that one lawyer act on their behalf.  Insofar as conflicts of interests would 
exist between the alleged victims, separate lawyers could possibly assume their representation. 
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participate in the proceedings.226  This reform would just ensure that they have 
the right to make arguments or introduce evidence supporting the defendant’s 
guilt. 
Hence, there are laudable aspects to alleged victims playing an important 
role in proceedings but only so long as their participation does not undermine 
defendants’ rights.  By drawing the line between an alleged victim and an 
actual victim, the proposed reforms could technically allow alleged victims to 
participate without violating defendants’ rights. 
VII.  PREDICTABLE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE PROPOSED REFORMS 
This author’s arguments calling for reforms to the ICC Statute and Rules 
will likely face the three following predictable counterarguments.  First, the 
proposed reforms will grant excessive rights to defendants and thereby create a 
nearly unattainable bar for convicting persons guilty of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.  This position shall be referred to as the 
“excessive rights argument.”  Second, the call for reforms are much a-do about 
nothing because it is unreasonably far-fetched to posit that the ICC could 
deprive defendants of a fair trial marked by due process of law, as the ICC 
exemplifies rigorous international norms and standards on the administration 
of justice.  This is the “much a-do about nothing argument.”  Third, the 
reforms are not called for because they will protect defendants at the expense 
of the victims’ fundamental right to participate in the proceedings.  This is the 
“victims’ rights argument.”  These counterarguments are addressed in turn. 
A. The Excessive Rights Argument 
The excessive rights argument would stress the following points: The 
proposed reforms are pointless because virtually all defendants are guilty 
anyway, even if they are not guilty of every technical count.  The ICC already 
grants defendants adequate protections.227  Giving defendants even stronger 
rights will create unnecessary hurdles in the work of the ICC Prosecutor and 
other law enforcement authorities who have worked conscientiously to arrest 
defendants and bring them to trial.  If lofty philosophical principles or 
misplaced sympathy lead to excessive rights for defendants, the bar for 
conviction will be raised so high that numerous guilty persons will be 
acquitted.  In the end, impunity will prevail, thereby defeating the ICC’s 
purpose. 
Before rebutting this argument, it is necessary to concede that there is truth 
to the contention that the handful of people who are charged with genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes are virtually always found guilty.  
 
 226. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68. 
 227. See id. at arts. 66, 67. 
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This is evidenced by examining the differences between ordinary prosecutions 
for common crimes and high-profile international prosecutions for ICC-type 
crimes. 
Ordinary criminal cases typically involve a limited number of perpetrators 
and victims and often only one defendant and one victim.228  There is usually 
some doubt—perhaps reasonable doubt—about the perpetrators’ identity.  The 
criminal process therefore largely serves to determine who committed the 
crime.  After a crime is reported, the police investigate the case and eventually 
arrest a suspect.  If prosecutors decide to charge the suspect with a crime, he 
then becomes a defendant.  He subsequently stands trial, during which the trier 
of fact (judge or jury) determines whether he is guilty as charged in light of the 
evidence.  Accordingly, except in cases where the defendant is convicted 
pursuant to a plea-bargaining agreement, the criminal trial has an essential 
fact-finding purpose to determine whether the accused is actually guilty or 
innocent, and it is often uncertain whether the defendant will be convicted at 
all. 
Conversely, high-profile international prosecutions dealing with genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes usually focus on wide scale atrocities 
that have been committed by numerous perpetrators against hundreds or 
thousands of victims.  The identity of the average perpetrator is difficult to 
determine, as many random soldiers or civilians have partaken in gratuitous 
killings, punitive expeditions, mob actions, and other abuses.  Yet, there is 
usually little doubt about the chief culprits’ identities, as they are persons who 
ranked high in the chain of command and either directed or deliberately 
condoned atrocities.  These are the persons who are likely to be targeted by 
prosecutors, who have insufficient time and resources to investigate and 
prosecute every crime, especially in light of the high number of overall 
perpetrators.  Because prosecutors in high-profile international criminal cases 
usually only target a few political or military leaders who are “the worst of the 
worst,” virtually everyone knows that the defendants are going to be found 
guilty.  For instance, in light of the atrocities committed by the Serbian forces 
during the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, nobody can reasonably argue that 
then-president, Slobodan Milosevic, and his key commanders were completely 
innocent of war crimes.229  Similarly, no reasonable person would argue that 
 
 228. Even the extraordinary case of the serial killer is incomparable to international criminal 
trials involving hundreds or thousands of victims. 
 229. This article devotes much attention to the case of the late Slobodan Milosevic.  It 
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Succession.  See United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key 
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Saddam Hussein and his close aides were fully innocent of gross human rights 
violations during Hussein’s tenure as President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003.  
There is virtually no doubt that the courts will find these types of defendants 
guilty.  This is especially true in light of the damning evidence against them 
and the vast number of crimes committed, which allow prosecutors to 
selectively press charges for those crimes that are particularly likely to result in 
guilty verdicts.  In the end, the courts may not find the defendants guilty on 
every charge, but the defendants will surely be found guilty of some egregious 
crimes, especially if the courts are free from corruption or undue influence. 
Accordingly, one may argue that in high-profile international criminal 
cases, the purpose of the criminal process is not to conduct a fact-finding 
inquiry to discover the culprits’ identities, as there is no question that the 
defendants are culpable.  This argument should not be misconstrued as 
contending that the criminal process in high-profile international prosecutions 
is futile.  The fact-finding inquiry remains important as a means of establishing 
legal proof of guilt, such as by demonstrating exactly how the defendant 
committed the crime or assisted others in its perpetration.  It is necessary for 
international prosecutions to painstakingly follow all the steps of the criminal 
process.  But that does not change the fact that we can correctly expect the 
overwhelming majority of the defendants to be found guilty. 
This argument is supported by an examination of the outcomes of cases 
tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  
Established by the UN Security Council in 1993, the ICTY has tried persons 
accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law during the Wars of Yugoslav 
Succession.230  As illustrated in Table 1, a total of 161 persons have been 
indicted at the ICTY.231  Out of fifty-six cases completed through appeal so 
far, only five defendants have been acquitted on all counts.232  Since three 
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defendants were acquitted on appeal, this signifies that fifty-four out of fifty-
six trials resulted in guilty verdicts.233  Thus, the Trial Chamber has been 
overwhelmingly likely to find defendants guilty.  Appellate review was also 
prone to deny significant relief to convicted defendants, as only three out of 
fifty-four trial convictions were vacated on appeal.234  Of course, many cases 
are still at the pre-trial stage, and several trials have not yet been concluded.  
Additionally, there have been twenty-five withdrawn indictments.235  Yet, 
precedents suggest very high odds that defendants tried at the ICTY will be 
convicted.236 
On the other hand, any contention that the ICTY’s high conviction rate 
demonstrates biases against defendants can be rebutted by the fact that 
defendants have been vested with significant due process rights.237  The high 
conviction rate is not necessarily caused by any biases against defendants.  
Under Occam’s Razor—“All other things being equal, the simplest explanation 
tends to be the best”—the reason why the conviction rate is so high may 
simply be that defendants are indeed virtually always guilty.  As formerly 
argued, prosecutors in ICTY cases will focus their time and resources on 
targeting a relatively small number of perpetrators who bear the greatest 
criminal responsibility for the widespread abuses committed during the Wars 
of Yugoslav Succession.  The principal reason why few defendants have been 
acquitted could be that prosecutors carefully investigated cases and declined to 
pursue suspects who would probably be found not guilty. 
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TABLE 1: KEY FIGURES OF ICTY CASES238 
 
ICTY Case Status Cases 
Acquitted at trial 2 
Acquitted on appeal 3 
Convicted 51 
TOTAL CASES COMPLETED THROUGH APPEAL 56 
TOTAL CONVICTED PENDING APPEAL 11 
Withdrawn indictment before commencement of 
proceedings 
20 
Withdrawn indictment after commencement of proceedings 5 
TOTAL WITHDRAWN INDICTMENTS 25 
Defendant died before commencement of proceedings 7 
Defendant died after commencement of proceedings 4 
TOTAL DEAD DEFENDANTS 11239 
TOTAL DEFENDANTS TRANSFERRED TO NATIONAL 
COURTS 
13 
TOTAL DEFENDANTS AT LARGE 4 
TOTAL DEFENDANTS IN PRE-TRIAL OR TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
41 
TOTAL INDICTMENTS 161 
 
Nevertheless, focusing on the overall conviction rate could obscure 
subtleties in conviction patterns, as certain defendants have been convicted on 
some counts but acquitted on others.  For instance, Goran Jelisic was convicted 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity but acquitted of genocide, in spite 
of his role in the brutalization or murder of an estimated thousands of Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats at a concentration camp.240 
Further, the high conviction rate does not reflect the fact that prosecutors 
have sometimes faced serious challenges to prove a defendant’s guilt.  For 
instance, many commentators believe that Milosevic would have been 
 
 238. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key Figures 
of ICTY Cases, supra note  229. 
 239. In addition, Milan Babić and Miroslav Deronjić died while serving their sentences.  Id. 
 240. Stacy Sullivan, Milosevic and Genocide: Has the Prosecution Made the Case?, FOREIGN 
POLICY IN FOCUS, Feb. 19, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.irc-online.org/fpif/pdf/gac/ 
0402milosevic.pdf (last visited April 13, 2007). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND DEFENDANTS AT THE ICC 289 
acquitted of genocide if his trial had been completed241 before his death.242  
After the prosecution rested its case in February 25, 2004, Carla Del Ponte, the 
head prosecutor, admitted that specific intent to commit genocide is hard to 
prove and stated: “I know that I don’t have the smoking gun in the count of 
genocide” against Milosevic.243  Milosevic could still have been convicted of 
complicity to commit genocide, a lesser offense, as evidence suggested that he 
knew that genocide was underway and aided and abetted its commission.244  
Milosevic should also have been convicted of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.245  Nevertheless, an acquittal on genocide would have been all over the 
headlines. 
Any shortcomings by prosecutors at the ICTY could be partly attributable 
to “good lawyering” for defendants, who are generally defended by elite 
lawyers.  Even Milosevic, who had a law degree246 and acted essentially as his 
own lawyer, managed to score points in his defense case.247  He conducted the 
skillful cross-examination of key witnesses like Mahmut Bakalli, an Albanian 
politician, who unconvincingly contended that he was unaware of any arms 
trafficking in Kosovo.248  Aside from his courtroom defense, an acquittal on 
genocide for Milosevic could have been the product of more sinister actions he 
may have undertaken before he was even indicted by the ICTY.  As the 
Yugoslav head of state from 1989 to 2000, Milosevic conceivably could have 
ensured that any evidence documenting a genocide plan would be destroyed.  
Although this has not been proven, the possibility of such schemes to destroy 
evidence in the case of Milosevic and other defendants should permeate the 
analysis of the ICTY’s verdicts. 
Accordingly, in high-profile cases like Milosevic’s, guilt is not easy to 
establish, especially if the prosecution must prove guilt by command 
responsibility, which generally requires documentary or testimonial evidence 
demonstrating the intent for subordinates to commit genocide and other 
atrocities.  Naturally, one may argue that this does not change the gist of the 
excessive rights argument: the proposed reforms to the victim standing rule are 
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pointless because virtually all defendants are guilty anyway, even if they are 
not guilty of every technical count. 
The rationale behind the excessive rights argument is that victim 
participation is not outcome-changing because virtually all defendants would 
still be convicted of at least one count even if the victims did not participate.249  
But this rationale is flawed.  Even at the ICTY, some defendants have been 
acquitted on all counts.250  Since we cannot know in advance which defendants 
will be found innocent, we should not let unfair procedures infect any 
defendant’s trial and therefore risk that he would be convicted and imprisoned 
on an improper basis.  Utilitarian considerations should not offset the 
guarantee of individual rights that the ICC provides to every defendant.  The 
Statute and Rules do not permit a utilitarian balancing test weighing a 
defendant and a victim’s interests against each other.  Article 68 § 3 bars any 
victim participation that is “prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused to a fair and impartial trial.”251  Even if many genuine victims would 
benefit from the victim standing rule, the ICC should not risk convicting an 
innocent person due to the unfair prejudice that the rule could create. 
A utilitarian approach would likewise ignore the importance of every count 
in an indictment.  Just because a defendant will surely be convicted of some 
counts does not mean that the ICC should disregard whether unfair prejudice 
will lead him to be improperly convicted of other counts for which he is 
innocent.  The excessive rights argument reflects disregard for the rule of law 
since all counts matter, especially when someone is charged with extremely 
grave deeds like genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.  Even if a 
defendant will inevitably be incarcerated on one count, his conviction on an 
additional count will generally result in a harsher sentence, thereby violating 
the defendant’s rights if conviction on the additional count was improper.252 
Respecting the inalienable dignity of an individual entails being mindful of 
the truth of what he did and did not do.  We should not jump to the conclusion 
that guilt for one crime means guilt for another, as legal rigor precludes such 
unsubstantiated assumptions.  Even though Milosevic undeniably had a lot of 
blood on his hands, that does not mean he committed genocide, which is 
perhaps the most horrible crime known to mankind.  Whereas some critics like 
human rights advocate Samantha Power have argued that Milosevic’s likely 
acquittal for genocide would mean that the ICTY has created unattainable 
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standards for conviction,253 this claim is contradicted by the overwhelming 
majority of guilty verdicts handed down by the Court.254  All trials have an 
important fact-finding purpose, and guilt must be established under the 
applicable standard of proof if a court is to have legitimacy.  But this can only 
happen if we preserve each defendant’s due process safeguards, thereby 
justifying the proposed reforms to the ICC’s victim standing rule. 
In spite of all these considerations, the excessive rights argument may 
serve as the chief basis for opposition to amending the victim standing rule.  
The provisions enabled by the Rome Statute were the product of zealous 
negotiations and reluctant compromises conducted over years and years by the 
representatives of a host of countries separated by different cultures, histories, 
legal traditions, and geopolitical interests.255  Reaching the necessary 
consensus to amend the Court’s procedures could be at least as challenging.  
Thus, the member states may be tepid or hostile to proposals for amending the 
victim standing rule to provide greater rights to defendants, especially if they 
feel that the Statute and Rules already sufficiently protect defendants.  Hence, 
the excessive rights argument may amount to a statement about the difficult 
political feasibility of amending the rule.  Yet, even if the benefits of an 
amendment are unrealizable, an adequate interpretation of the rule would be 
equally beneficial. 
B. The Much A-Do About Nothing Argument 
The much a-do about nothing argument is as follows: It is utterly unlikely 
that defendants will face unfair prejudice while tried at the ICC, which 
comports with rigorous international norms and standards on the 
administration of justice.  ICC judges are among the greatest jurists in the 
world, and they have the experience, knowledge, and professionalism to 
administer proceedings so as to avoid any unfair prejudice—no matter how 
unpopular the defendant or how heinous the charged offense may be.256  The 
ICC is meant to be a model of justice for the world to follow and will therefore 
operate under tremendous scrutiny by political leaders, the media, and the 
general public.  For all these reasons, it is unfathomable that any defendant at 
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the ICC will be deprived of his right to a fair trial marked by due process of 
law. 
This is a cogent argument insofar as it posits that the ICC will not 
deliberately or gratuitously violate defendants’ rights.  It is undeniable that the 
Court’s Statute and Rules generally guarantee due process and fairness to all 
defendants, thereby comporting with international norms and standards for 
criminal trials.  It is also true that ICC judges have the savvy to administer 
proceedings in a just manner.  The ICC is indeed a model of justice for the 
world and is far removed from the unfairness of victor’s justice.  Nevertheless, 
there are significant flaws with the much a-do about nothing argument. 
First, a court can violate a defendant’s rights even if it sincerely desires to 
administer a fair trial.  This is particularly likely to happen when the court must 
apply laws that are unfairly prejudicial to a defendant.  Since judges will have 
little choice but to apply the victim standing rule, unfair prejudice might occur 
regardless of their intentions.  Thus, even with all the goodwill in the world, 
the ICC could deprive defendants of their right to a fair trial marked by due 
process of law. 
Second, it is not unfathomable that ICC judges could sometimes fail to be 
impartial in spite of the Court’s mission and intense public scrutiny.  Initially, 
it must be noted that bias against criminal defendants is commonplace.  Of 
course, the general public often thinks that if someone has been arrested for 
murder, assault, or rape, he is probably not a “choir-boy.”  By the same token, 
the general public is inclined to think that if a defendant is one of the few 
persons facing a high-profile trial for genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and other abuses involving hundreds or thousands of victims, he 
probably has blood on his hands.  Of course, when it comes to the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant, there are significant differences between the views 
of the general public and the impartial, sophisticated positions judges are 
usually able to attain.  Yet, judges are human beings too, and their decisions 
are sometimes affected by biases against defendants.  Although quite 
imponderable, judicial bias may occur when judges have to deal with a 
defendant who appears utterly unsympathetic.  Consider a defendant, who acts 
in an unruly manner in court, is being tried for extremely heinous crimes, and 
is perceived as guilty by the vast majority of top political leaders, the media, 
and the general public.  Enter Slobodan Milosevic. 
While on trial at the ICTY, Milosevic acted as a grand provocateur with 
his uncouth demeanor and his frequent questioning of the Court’s power to try 
him.  On his first appearance, Milosevic expressly refused to acknowledge the 
Court’s authority and stated that “[his] trial’s aim is to produce false 
justification for the war crimes of NATO committed in Yugoslavia.”257  He 
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also described his trial as “an evil and hostile action aimed at justifying the 
crimes committed against my country.”258  For instance, he argued that the 
massacre of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995 was a 
conspiracy conducted by French spies and the Bosnian Muslim government.259  
These allegations caused tremendous uproar, as the conventional idea among 
Westerners is that Serbs were responsible for the Wars of Yugoslav Succession 
due to nationalist politics meant to create a “Greater Serbia” under the pretense 
of self-defense.260  For instance, Warren Zimmermann, the last American 
ambassador to Yugoslavia, has criticized Serbs for historically defining 
themselves as victims of both Western powers and their non-Serb neighbors.261  
Milosevic has indeed stated that his trial is “an attempt to turn the victim into 
the culprit.”262  He and his supporters believe that the Serbs’ participation in 
the wars was mere self-defense against Slovenes, Croats, Muslim 
fundamentalists, and Kosovar terrorists who were all supported by NATO in 
their efforts to either oppress Serbs or unlawfully secede from a fraternal 
federal state of Yugoslavia.263  At the ICTY, Milosevic argued that NATO 
“supported a totalitarian chauvinist elite, terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists, 
neo-Nazis whose objective was an ethnically pure state, that is to say a state 
without any Serbs.”264  Milosevic’s contemptuous tirades questioning the 
Court’s legitimacy and denouncing an anti-Serb conspiracy contributed to 
several spats between Milosevic and Presiding Judge Richard May.265 
Milosevic’s trial strategy was criticized for relying on obstructionist 
methods serving to unduly delay the conclusion of his trial.266  Milosevic 
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initially moved to call 1,631 witnesses, which was over five times more than 
the number called by the prosecution.267  The witness list included former 
American President Bill Clinton and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
so Milosevic could question them about what he believed was a NATO 
conspiracy to break up Yugoslavia and harm Serbs.268  After presenting his 
first 40 witnesses, Milosevic conceded to call “only” 199 more witnesses, 
which he described as “the absolute minimum.”269  This defense strategy 
precluded him from keeping up with the trial schedule.270  Even though 
Milosevic’s trial ended with his death, it began in February 2002 and was the 
longest international trial in history.271  Delays were also caused by 
Milosevic’s poor health, as doctors concluded he needed extended rest periods.  
This was particularly problematic since Milosevic acted as his own lawyer.272  
His Serbian lawyers only assisted him outside the courtroom, and he 
obstinately refused to consort with two British lawyers appointed by the Court 
to defend him.273 
Milosevic was therefore not in the Court’s good graces.  Naturally, these 
tensions may not have led to judicial bias depriving Milosevic of his right to a 
fair trial.  Even so, a basic point can be drawn from Milosevic’s case.  
Prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other 
gross atrocities involve intense emotions.  Of course, emotions do not consist 
exclusively of outbursts such as Milosevic’s.  Emotions can also be more 
subtly internalized in our psyche.  In a criminal trial, emotions often translate 
into conscious or subconscious feelings of sympathy or antipathy towards a 
defendant or a victim.  Of course, judges have the duty to detach themselves 
from emotions so that they can rationally decide issues without any bias or 
unfair prejudice.  But it is unrealistic to expect that judges can always be 
totally impassive to emotion, especially in high-profile international 
prosecutions characterized by the unspeakable enormity of atrocities wrought 
on victims, extreme unpopularity of defendants, critical political stakes, and 
intense media coverage. 
Numerous ICC cases will likely be characterized by the same factors that 
have made Milosevic’s trial so emotional.  But ICC cases will also have to 
handle victim participation, whereas the ICTY does not give victims standing 
to participate throughout proceedings.  Under these circumstances, it is 
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difficult to imagine that victim involvement will not exacerbate the inherent 
emotional nature of the proceedings.  Judge Claude Jorda, former ICTY Judge 
and President, as well as former Presiding Judge in the ICC’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber, and Jérôme de Hemptinne, the ICTY’s Legal Officer, have 
recognized the possibility that ICC judges may be biased against the accused if 
the judges read the preliminary statements of victims before trial.274  The 
victims’ presence, and possible emotional behavior, could lead judges to 
sympathize with them and antagonize defendants.  Even if the victims 
themselves are not present in court, their lawyers will describe the harm they 
allegedly suffered due to the defendants’ actions, which could lead judges to 
side with the victims, especially since judges could generally consider them to 
be true victims pursuant to granting their application to enter the 
proceedings—again before proof beyond reasonable doubt has established that 
a crime occurred and that they are actual victims.  Unless the ICC adopts the 
panglossian notion that everything will always be for the best in its 
proceedings; it should consider that the risk of judicial bias, even by well-
intentioned and eminently qualified judges, accentuates the need for an 
adequate procedure to reconcile the conflicting rights of victims and 
defendants. 
C. The Victims’ Rights Argument 
The victims’ rights argument revolves around these points: By seeking to 
either undercut the victim standing rule or eliminate it altogether, the proposed 
reforms will improperly protect defendants at the expense of the victims.  All 
victims must be allowed to vindicate their interests by fully participating 
throughout judicial proceedings.  Whereas the ICC already grants adequate 
rights to defendants,275 the proposed reforms evince greater concern for the 
well-being of criminals than for the victims’ moral need for justice. 
More specifically, Marion Brienen and Ernestine Hoegen, who are victims’ 
rights advocates, contend that treating persons as alleged victims only adds 
insult to injury since it reflects a lack of respect for victims’ suffering.276  In 
discussing European criminal justice reform, they argue in favor of the 
presumption of truth of a person’s claim that he is a victim.277  They further 
posit that a presumption of truth for a victim does not compromise the 
defendant’s presumption of innocence.278 
At the outset, this author must emphasize that the reforms proposed in this 
article do not reflect a lack of preoccupation for victims’ need for justice.  
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Victims should unequivocally have the right to participate in reparation 
proceedings and in non-judicial forums.  However, they should not participate 
in court proceedings as actual victims until it has, at least, been proven beyond 
reasonable doubt that a crime occurred and that they are victims.  Requiring 
use of the denomination “alleged victim” or “private accuser” until proof has 
been made is not a sign of disrespect for the victims’ suffering.  Legal terms 
must always take into account what has been established or not, which is a 
principle espoused by the ICC Statute and Rules in referring to defendants.279 
Moreover, no legal system can fully recognize a presumption of truth for 
both an alleged victim and a defendant because the presumptions are 
irreconcilable.  In most cases, the alleged victim will allege, “the defendant 
committed a crime against me,” and the defendant will contend, “the victim is 
not telling the truth.”  The law cannot presume that such mutually-exclusive 
claims are both true.  The presumption of innocence not only presumes that the 
defendant is not the culprit; it also presumes that elements of a crime are not 
proved until they are actually proved beyond reasonable doubt.280  Again, two 
of these elements are that: 1) a crime occurred; and 2) there are victims. 
Part of the problem behind Brienen and Hoegen’s argument is traceable in 
their writing, which reflects a profound trust in the investigative authorities’ 
ability to systematically charge the right persons with the right crimes.  Their 
apparent conception that defendants are virtually always guilty precludes them 
from viewing a criminal trial as a truth-finding inquiry meant to uncover 
whether an accusation is truthful.  Under such a conception, a trial is a mere 
formality, and it is proper to let purported victims have their day in court even 
if it is unfairly prejudicial to defendants.  After all, if defendants are virtually 
always guilty, one can argue that the benefits of victim participation outweigh 
the costs of wrongfully convicting a small handful of innocents.  But this 
reverts to the type of balancing test that is not permitted at the ICC.  Article 68 
§ 3 stresses that victims do not have an absolute right to participate in 
proceedings and that their rights are trumped by defendants’ rights.281 
Another problem with the victims’ rights argument is that it often reflects 
the false assumption that participation in criminal proceedings is essential to 
victims’ interests.  In fact, criminal proceedings are not necessarily the best 
means of protecting victims’ interests when compared to truth and 
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reconciliation commissions.  Victims’ interests generally consist of: 1) 
obtaining closure and truth about the political affairs behind their 
victimization; 2) having a forum to speak and be heard; 3) receiving financial 
compensation for their harm; and 4) seeing that culprits get retribution so long 
as the punishment is reasonable.  Except for the last category, truth and 
reconciliation commissions may better serve victims than criminal 
proceedings. 
A criminal trial is largely a determination of the truth based on the findings 
of investigative authorities and a defendant’s counter-arguments.  A healthy 
dose of cynicism regarding the capacity of trials to unearth the truth is 
nonetheless appropriate.  After all, the verdict of a criminal case is more a 
measure of proof than of truth because an acquittal does not mean that a 
defendant is innocent.  It just means that the prosecution was unable to prove 
guilt.  Sometimes the truth will not come out because there is insufficient proof 
to convict a person who actually was guilty.282  In light of the threat of 
imprisonment and a stiff fine, it is not surprising that most guilty defendants 
adamantly deny all accusations and use every legal tactic to avoid conviction.  
In addition to putting the accused on the defensive, the prospect of punishment 
can lead national governments to obstruct the prosecution’s efforts to acquire 
evidence of abuses when a guilty verdict could pave the way for hefty state-
paid financial damages.  For this reason, ICTY prosecutors have alleged that 
Belgrade is doing everything it can to ensure that any evidence of genocidal 
intent is kept secret. 283 
The ICTY’s verdicts have had important political repercussions, as they 
influenced conceptions of who was responsible for the Wars of Yugoslav 
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Succession and the ensuing atrocities, and whether responsible parties would 
be held accountable.  Some commentators argued that an acquittal on the 
genocide charge for Milosevic would have had serious implications for future 
attempts to prosecute genocide and to deter its occurrence.284  It would also 
have consternated victims and provided ammunition for those denying that 
genocide was committed.285  On the other hand, Milosevic’s conviction on the 
genocide charge would have entered history books as “proof” that his regime 
was criminal, which would have helped some victims turn the page and eased 
the resentment of those who considered themselves to be Milosevic’s victims. 
In order to estimate the dramatic impact that Milosevic’s acquittal or 
conviction on the genocide charge would have had on politics in the Balkans if 
he had not died before the end of his trial,286 it is useful to consider the 
reactions to the decision rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
a related case where Bosnia sued Serbia and Montenegro for genocide.287  
Whereas the ICJ is not a criminal court and therefore cannot judge and punish 
individuals, the ICJ is responsible for adjudicating disputes between states.288  
In that capacity, the ICJ was called upon to decide whether the government of 
Serbia and Montenegro was responsible for committing genocide against the 
people of the state of Bosnia.289  This was the first time in history where a state 
sued another for genocide.290  The ICJ held that Serbia was not directly 
responsible for the genocide of nearly 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in 1995, 
although it noted that Serbia “could and should” have prevented the killings as 
the Genocide Convention requires, since the genocide was committed by 
Bosnian Serb troops that had close links to the Serb government.291  “A 
minority of four judges found Serbia guilty of complicity in the genocide.”292  
The outcome significantly favored Serbia, which was absolved of having to 
pay substantial financial reparations that Bosnia had demanded.293  Serbia will 
nonetheless endure the stigma of being, at least in some measure, associated 
with genocide.294 Serbia had contended that it did not control events in Bosnia 
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and that a verdict for Bosnia would have further complicated reconciliation 
between the neighbors,295 although there is no reason to believe that the ICJ’s 
ruling in favor of Serbia will in any way facilitate reconciliation.  Indeed, 
Bosnian Muslims angrily dismissed the ICJ’s ruling as a disgrace,296 as Bosnia 
had insisted that the ICJ’s recognition of Serbia’s responsibility for genocide 
was more important than reparations.297 
For better or worse, the ICTY and ICJ’s verdicts will likely influence 
politics for years to come in the historically unstable and war-prone Balkans.  
Notably, certain international law experts described the ICJ’s decision as a 
tactful political compromise.298  Bosnians will be especially resentful insofar 
as they believe that such a political compromise led the ICJ to rule in favor of 
Serbia in the genocide case.299  In turn, the ICC’s verdicts will also probably 
have a significant influence over political affairs in conflict-prone societies.  
Under these circumstances, the acquittal of guilty defendants due to their 
resistance or to state obstruction would obviously frustrate victims’ attempts to 
expose the truth about their suffering and to have the culprits’ officially 
recognized, which could also lead victims to accuse the ICC of making 
improper political compromises. 
Victims may also become frustrated with the trial process.  To many, 
justice delayed is justice denied, especially if the verdict is anything less than a 
finding of guilt on all counts.  But proceedings in ICTR and ICTY cases have 
often dragged on for months or years.300  Victim participation could easily 
make proceedings even longer at the ICC.  Victim litigants or victims at large 
will be annoyed with the wait, especially since their need for closure might not 
be satisfied until cases’ outcomes are finite through appeal.  These problems 
will be compounded by the ICC’s location in The Hague, which will inevitably 
appear remote to many victims in distant countries.  The U.N. special tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda are based in The Hague and in 
Arusha, Tanzania, many miles away from the scene of the crimes they are 
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judging.301  “[B]ecause the sessions are often tedious and rarely broadcast back 
home, survivors, bystanders, and fellow perpetrators pay almost no attention.  
(Contrast this with the Israelis glued to their radios during the 1961 trial of 
Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem.)”302 
Criminal trials may consequently be unable to satisfy victims’ need for 
truth and justice.  Nevertheless, criminal trials, with all their underlying due 
process guarantees, are the best means of finding the truth when the truth may 
result in the accused being imprisoned or otherwise punished.  However, in 
cases where the international community is willing to sacrifice the possibility 
of punishing the accused in exchange for greater truth, the international 
community should consider foregoing criminal prosecutions in favor of 
investigation by truth and reconciliation commissions.  While the latter are 
typically established by national governments, the United Nations has also 
played a role in sponsoring commissions, such as in El Salvador.303  
“[E]merging principles of international law have recognized a right of victims 
and their families to be apprised of the truth concerning human rights abuses 
and a corresponding duty upon States to investigate and disseminate the 
truth.”304  This is particularly important to help provide closure to the victims 
of abuses and facilitate transition into a stable post-conflict democracy.  For 
instance, a truth and reconciliation commission contributed to Chile’s 
transition from the Pinochet dictatorship into a rather stable and prosperous 
democracy.305  In 1991, Chilean president Patricio Aylwin presented the 
commission’s report on national television, publicly apologized to the victims, 
and sent a copy of the report to each victimized family with a letter indicating 
on what page information on the victims could be found.306 
Moreover, South Africa’s commission has unraveled much information by 
eliciting admissions from perpetrators who would have denied all accusations 
if they had faced the threat of criminal punishment.  South Africa employed a 
novel approach by granting its commission the power to issue an amnesty for 
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individuals who acknowledged politically-motivated offenses.  Over 7,500 
perpetrators submitted applications for amnesty.307  The admissions of 
numerous perpetrators led the commission to find other perpetrators, who in 
turn applied for amnesty in exchange for their own admissions.308  In the end, 
the process enabled the commission to elicit “dramatic admissions about the 
apartheid regime’s abuses.”309  The international community has lauded the 
commission’s approach, although some South Africans felt that it enabled 
abusers to have impunity.  Insofar as the amnesty program was successful, it 
was only so because the South African government was able to use the threat 
of prosecution to encourage perpetrators to apply for amnesty and reveal their 
wrongdoing.310 
Truth commissions can therefore effectively discover the truth about a 
pattern of gross human rights abuses.  Of course, the complete truth will not 
always come out.  Some offenders will be acquitted in criminal court, and 
others will never admit to wrongdoing even if they are not prosecuted.  But 
there is a greater risk that the truth will not be uncovered when criminal 
prosecutions are chosen instead of truth and reconciliation commissions.311  
That is the price to pay if the international community seeks to punish 
someone. 
In addition to better serving victims’ need for truth and closure, 
commissions will provide a greater opportunity for victims to speak and be 
heard than ICC proceedings.  In a criminal trial, victims can only speak as 
witnesses, but judges will only allow a limited number of victims to testify 
about the harm the defendant caused them due to the requirement of a speedy 
trial and the prohibition on cumulative evidence.  Testifying victims will 
additionally have to answer rather narrow questions related to specific legal 
issues, instead of being able to vent all their thoughts and emotions about their 
suffering.  Conversely, commission hearings will allow numerous victims to 
 
 307. Abrams & Hayner, supra note 311, at 304. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id.  The successes of the amnesty program have been mitigated by the South African 
government’s unwillingness to prosecute persons who failed to apply for amnesty or fully 
cooperate with the commission.  Paul Van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in POST-
CONFLICT JUSTICE 745, 745 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002). 
 311. It must nonetheless be underlined that the effectiveness of past truth commissions has 
sometimes been limited by their status as non-permanent bodies.  They are difficult and time-
consuming to assemble, and often do not have sufficient resources to investigate all abuses.  
Abrams & Hayner, supra note 304, at 286-88.  Accordingly, it is worth exploring the idea of a 
permanent United Nations Truth and Reconciliation Commission with adequate staffing and 
resources to tackle the numerous conflicts persisting in the world.  The commission could even 
work in unison with the ICC.  If an accused person refused to comply with the commission’s 
requests for truth, he could then be prosecuted at the ICC. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
302 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:249 
appear and fully express their views, thereby serving as a superior forum than 
the ICC for this purpose. 
Additionally, victims might be more likely to receive financial 
compensation at commissions than at the ICC.  Punishment pursuant to a guilty 
verdict at the ICC will take the form of either an order of financial 
compensation to be paid by the defendant to the victim and/or imprisonment of 
the defendant for a term of years.312  However, due to practical limitations, 
ordering defendants to pay financial compensation is unlikely to satisfy 
victims’ needs.  It has already been explained that the typical ICC case will 
involve a handful of high-profile defendants and hundreds or even thousands 
of victims of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.  The sheer 
contrast between the small number of defendants and the high number of 
victims signifies that virtually no defendant will have the personal resources to 
pay meaningful compensation to victims, especially considering the 
monumental financial damages involved in ICC cases.  While victims may be 
pleased to see defendants lose all their assets as a result of an order of 
compensation, victims will remain unsatisfied because they will not receive 
any large sum from defendants.  This is partly why the ICC realistically allows 
damages to be paid through a special Trust Fund alimented by the member 
states.313  But the ICC will not allow financial compensation for offenses for 
which a defendant is acquitted.314  Compensation for the victim is therefore 
contingent on the prosecution being able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
a particular defendant committed a crime.  Whereas victims at the ICC 
probably will be compensated by the Trust Fund since it can be expected that 
defendants typically will not be able to pay full damages, victims might be 
more likely to receive these public funds from a U.N.-sponsored truth 
commission than from the ICC.  Indeed, a commission can formally recognize 
someone as a victim pursuant to an investigation without having to first 
establish that a particular individual is guilty of a crime beyond reasonable 
doubt, which is a high burden of proof.  A commission can even compensate a 
victim if authorities have nobody to prosecute because the perpetrator is 
unknown or at large.315 
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Hence, a commission might better satisfy victims’ need for obtaining truth, 
being heard, and receiving financial compensation than the ICC might be able 
to.  Advocates of victim participation in ICC proceedings may therefore have 
promised victims more than what the Court can actually deliver.  An ICC 
prosecution may only provide greater satisfaction to victims insofar as they 
wish for perpetrators to receive retributive punishment by imprisonment.  To 
many victims, this would understandably constitute a sufficient reason to 
prefer that a perpetrator be prosecuted despite the risk of acquittal, instead of 
him receiving amnesty pursuant to a truth and reconciliation process.  After all, 
commissions “cannot directly punish perpetrators, beyond stigmatizing them or 
recommending non-criminal measures such as removal from positions in the 
government or armed forces.  Such sanctions seem a paltry substitute for trial 
punishment where a person is personally responsible for atrocities of the 
highest magnitude.”316  The necessary compromise that commissions have 
made for finding the truth has often been to forego prosecution altogether.317  
But ICC-type crimes must ordinarily be prosecuted in order to avoid impunity 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  Whereas the deterrent 
value of international prosecutions is perhaps imponderable, at least some 
political and military leaders have realized that they may be brought to justice 
if they go too far.  The last decade has marked a new era in international justice 
with the creation of the U.N. tribunals for Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the ICC.  The time may be over when a 
brutal dictator like Mobutu Sese Seko could just move into a comfortable exile 
and never be brought to justice.318 
Beside deterrence, one may feel that prosecuting mass abusers is a moral 
obligation because it would be insufferable not to exert retribution on 
individuals responsible for unspeakable atrocities.  David Scheffer, who was 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes under the Clinton administration from 
1997 to 2001, has stated: 
Accountability is society’s collective judgment about how both to forgive and 
to punish, in this case for crimes that directly assault humankind as a whole 
and the very meaning of faith among the world’s leading religions.  For these 
crimes, the courtroom remains the great leveler, addressing both the 
perpetrators and the victims through the revelation of the truth and also 
through the knowledge that consequences flow from evil actions.319 
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The necessity of pursuing accountability through criminal prosecutions at 
the ICC can still be reconciled with the establishment of truth commissions.  A 
commission’s purpose is far from synonymous with granting impunity to 
perpetrators, as even in South Africa, fewer than 10% of the over 7,500 
persons who applied for amnesty actually received it.320  By submitting its 
comprehensive investigative findings to executive officials, a commission may 
actually facilitate prosecution, as was the case in Argentina, Chile, South 
Africa, and Uganda.321 
In sum, truth and reconciliation commissions can generally far better 
address victims’ needs than the ICC.  Further, by focusing narrowly on the 
importance of victims participating as litigants at the ICC, certain victim rights 
advocates may have neglected the need to advocate for the creation of truth 
and reconciliation commissions, and may have overlooked that the ICC and 
such commissions can coexist and significantly complement each other. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The ICC is a long overdue and much-needed international institution that 
will advance the interests of justice and human rights.  Its victim standing rule 
could nonetheless violate defendants’ rights because of procedural problems.  
The rule is largely based on European criminal procedures, which are vastly 
different from American criminal procedures.  This article’s arguments could 
therefore be misconstrued as evincing the conception that, by barring victim 
participation, American procedures better protect defendants’ rights than 
European procedures.  However, there is little doubt that criminal defendants 
fare much worse in America than in Europe. 
America has by far the highest incarceration rate in the entire world, and a 
far greater proportion of Americans are incarcerated than Europeans.322  Life 
sentences are constitutionally permissible for minor non-violent offenses.323  
Even teenagers commonly receive life sentences, a practice which is virtually 
nonexistent in any other country.324  On December 1, 2005, the 1,000th person 
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was executed in America since the Supreme Court reauthorized capital 
punishment in 1976,325 although the death penalty has been abolished in law or 
in practice by more than half of all countries, in conformance with the growing 
international recognition of the death penalty as a human rights violation.326  
Further, indigent defendants in America are frequently appointed lawyers who 
have neither the personal motivation nor financial incentives to represent 
defendants zealously.327  Systemic racial discrimination in sentencing has gone 
ignored by legislators and the Supreme Court.328 
In sum, while America may be a model in other areas, its criminal justice 
practices are far from exemplary.  Whereas this paper may reflect arguments, 
assumptions, and premises particular to American jurisprudence, it should not 
be construed as positing that American or common law procedures are 
necessarily superior to the European procedures that have served as a model 
for the ICC’s victim standing rule.  The purpose of this article is not to 
compare European and American domestic practices.  Instead, it is to analyze 
the ICC victim standing rule, which will apply in the vastly different context of 
high-profile international prosecutions with critical political implications and a 
non-negligible emotional dimension. Under these circumstances, victim 
participation could prove unfairly prejudicial to defendants, especially 
considering the deficiencies of the Court’s Statute and Rules when it comes to 
concretely defining the nature of victim standing.  But yet again, European 
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countries seem to manage to conciliate the presumption of innocence of the 
accused and the presumption of truth of the victim.329 
Moreover, the possibility of bias against defendants at the ICC must be 
compared to the alternative form of justice.  Many suspects who are not tried 
by the ICC (or another international court) could face summary extrajudicial 
executions without standing trial.  Others could face trials conducted by 
vindictive national courts offering far fewer due process guarantees and 
harsher punishments, including oftentimes the death penalty.  For instance, the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal sentenced Saddam Hussein to death after a trial marred 
by due process deficiencies and political interferences, despite the 
reasonableness of the guilty verdict per se.330  Conversely, the ICC provides 
significant due process guarantees to defendants and its harshest punishment is 
life imprisonment, which will presumably be reserved for the absolutely most 
outrageous crimes, such as genocide.331  One may therefore posit that 
international justice is necessarily “pro-defendant” relative to such 
alternatives.332 
In the end, time will tell whether victim participation at the ICC will 
conflict with the rights of the accused.  The Court should nonetheless 
contemplate reconciling the conflicting rights of victims and defendants.  In 
particular, it is worth considering a redefinition of victim litigants as “alleged 
victims” in order to avoid lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof and 
shifting this burden to the defense by compelling it to rebut elements that have 
not been established beyond reasonable doubt, thereby undermining the 
presumption of innocence.  However, even if the victim standing rule is 
unchanged and applied in a way that is utterly favorable to alleged victims at 
the expense of every defendant’s rights to a fair trial marked by due process of 
law, it must not be forgotten that ICC prosecutions may in certain respects 
prove less satisfactory for victims than truth and reconciliation commissions.  
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Victim participation in ICC proceedings will not be a panacea and should not 
discourage the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions to 
address victims’ needs and facilitate peaceful democratic transition in post-
conflict societies. 
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